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Federal Regulation of Land Sales:
Full Disclosure Comes Down to Earth
Ronald 1. Coffey
fames d'A. Welch
I. INTRODUCTION
la T IS ARGUABLE - if not beyond cavil - that state and fed-
eral securities laws have effectively diminished the opportuni-
ties for reaping overnight bonanza profits from the sale of "blue
sky" to uninformed or misinformed investors.' However, the "se-
curity" concept has not been de-
veloped to embrace all the tan-
TiB AUTHORS: RONALD J. COFiEY talizing "pies-in-the-sky" served
(A.B., Xavier University; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Cincinnati; LL.M., Harvard up by poorly financed, inept, or
University) is an Associate Professor of downright mendacious promot-
Law at Case Western Reserve University ers. Outside the protective pur-
and is admitted to the Ohio and Federal
Bars. His teaching specialties are Cot- ieus of securities regulation
porations, Securities Regulation, and falls the burgeoning, multifac-
Business Planning. JAMEs D'A. WELCH
(B.A., Colorado College; J.D., Case eted real estate business,- en-
Western Reserve University) is a prac- compassing the sale of a house
ticing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio and
is admitted to the Ohio Bar. between neighbors as well as the
sight-unseen marketing of wil-
derness by "boilerroom" pitch-
men who dun their citified and susceptible prospects by WATS tele-
phone.3 Between these extremes lie the many forms of real estate
mongering, some innocent and straightforward enough, but others
so fraught with opportunities for sharp practice or outright fraud
that legislative reaction, in retrospect, seems to have been almost in-
evitable.
I Regarding the effects of disclosure in the federal scheme, see SEC, REPORT ON
DISCLOSURE TO INvESToRs - A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POL-
Ic113s UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 46-54 (CCH ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
WHEAT REPORT].
2 Not all sales of real estate are beyond the ambit of securities regulation. In fact,
many real property transactions which have escaped the notice of securities agencies
might very well constitute securities. See text accompanying notes 42-53 infra.
3 For the uninitiated, a "boiler room" typically consists of a group of high pressure
salesmen who spend their days making hard sell telephone calls to prospective pur-
chasers of land. The land promoters frequently use the "wide area telephone service"
(WATS), an arrangement whereby they are permitted to make any number of long
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Congress' latest bout with the real estate industry began with
hearings before the Senate Special Committee on Aging in early
1963.4  The testimony laid bare an industry, ambitious and adoles-
cent, actively engaged in marketing raw and semideveloped subdi-
vided land to the "sunset set" by means of the mails, magazines,
newspapers, and personal or telephone solicitations.' The origin of
the 20th century land sales phenomenon was traced to a short-lived
boom during the 1920's.6 Revitalized in the forties, the industry
has attained spectacular proportions over the last fifteen years.'
From the 1963 Hearings, one thing was abundantly clear: Un-
told thousands were being flimflammed into purchasing parcels
which could not be inhabited without serious threat of death from
either thirst or drowning.8  While the volume of sight-unseen land
sales was uncertain, it was pegged at $500 million annually in
1963' - a figure which was to be revised to $700 million in 196410
and to $1 billion in 1967.11
Early in the federal legislative history, and throughout the hear-
ings and floor proceedings thereafter, one finds repeated agreement
that abuses in land sales could be laid at the door of only a minor-
ity of the industry. The precise ratio of bad apples to good never
distance calls within given boundaries for a flat monthly fee. See SENATE SUBCOMM.
ON FRAUDS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS AFFBCTiNG THE ELDERLY, 89TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., REPORT ON FRAUDS AND DECEPTIONS AFFECTING THE ELDERLY 36-37 (Comm.
Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 REPORT].
4 Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)
[hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings].
51d. at 141-50, 162, 184-235, 238-47, 253, 299-310, 482-89. Thus, while the
term "mail-order" sales was used to describe the marketing process, that phrase was
simply a shorthand convention for referring to many modes of merchandising property
sight (and site) unseen. As the hearings wore on over the years, legislative interest ex-
panded to encompass the sale of undeveloped or semideveloped land which the buyer
had been given an opportunity to "inspect." See text accompanying notes 20-25 infra.
6 Id. at 302-03, quoting Address by Attorney General Walter F. Mondale, National
Association of License Law Officials, in Minneapolis, May 10, 1962.
7 Id. at 302. It has been asserted that the American land sales boom was set off by
Christopher Columbus' letters to Ferdinand and Isabella. Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Frauds and Misrepresentations Affecting the Elderly of the Senate Special
Comm. on Aging, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Hear-
ings]. Two of history's most famous land promoters, George and Lawrence Washing-
ton, sold lots in Virginia on the installment plan. Id. at 344. The year 1962 appears
to be when state authorities decided to take concerted action against land promotion ac-
tivities. 1963 Hearings 230.
81963 Hearings 148-49.
9 Id. at 291.
10 1964 Hearings 3.
11 Hearings on S. 275 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hear-
ings].
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became dear. However, testimony indicates that overreaching was
more prevalent than anyone, including Congress, was willing to ad-
mit.12 Moreover, while elderly purchasers were the initial concern
of congressional inquiry, it soon became dear that a much broader
group was being exploited by the disreputable sector of the real es-
tate industry. 13
And so, in 1963, the stage was set for a five-year period of leg-
islative rumination, during which the congressional mind (or, more
precisely, the minds of that smaller group of senators who pondered
the need for land sales legislation) would reevaluate the basic phi-
losophies of protective regulation - the same philosophies which
were examined nearly 40 years ago in connection with the passage
of the federal securities laws. What follows is an elaboration of
the factual and policy antecedents which appear to have influenced
Congress' deliberations in reaching a solution to the land sales
problem. It is only through an appreciation of this background
that one can savor the true intent and meaning of the final leg-
islative product - the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.14
II. LEGISLATIVE AIMs AND POLICIES
A. Offensive Practices
Congressional concern over real estate sales practices seems to
have emanated from several principal sources. First, the physical
state or character of the land being sold dearly constituted a worri-
some factor. The Senate hearings were dominated by testimony
and discussion concerning large tracts of utterly raw "investment
acreage" and primitively subdivided "homesites."' 5  It is this type
of land which is least likely, in its natural state, to serve as a com-
fortable residential environment.' 6 Large tracts of undeveloped
12 "Many of the offerings are good merchandise, fairly presented. Numerically,
more are not." Letter from Robert R. Peacock to Harrison A. Williams, Jan. 11, 1963,
in 1963 Hearings 142. "[While it is a cliche that every industry is 90 percent legiti-
mate and dangers are posed only by a small minority on the periphery of the industry,
I do not believe this is true of the mail-order real estate industry." 1964 Hearings 90.
13 For example, servicemen abroad. See 1963 Hearings 188. By 1966, it was clear
that there had been a conscious broadening of interest. Hearings on S. 2672 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings].
14 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. 1969).
15 A distinction is drawn between "homesites," which are offered as potential build-
ing parcels, and "investment acreage," which is offered as an appreciation speculation.
See 1966 Hearings 7, 120; 1965 REPORT 33.
16 Vast acreage offerings frequently involve "swamps, deserts, high arid plateaus,
mountains, remote valleys, and - in some cases - actual jungles or lava beds outside
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land also present the greatest uncertainty and risk in terms of fu-
ture development and use. Even where there are no serious bar-
riers to human habitation - such as heat so intense and water so
scarce that even jackrabbits carry canteens 17 - the costs of opening
up an undeveloped expanse may be enormous, requiring the ener-
gies of a skilled and well-financed developer. However, while the
sale of bulk land located in hostile settings presents the most ex-
treme case for concern, it is clear that congressional solicitude ex-
tended to purchasers of other types of property as well.' 8 Congress,
responding at first to febrile outcries against swamp and desert
merchants, gradually came to realize that many of the evils which
attend the marketing of remote land might also pervade the sale
of subdivided agricultural tracts on the fringe of a large city. 19
Second, it was obvious that sales methods bulked large as a
cause for congressional intrusion into the real estate sector. Per-
haps the most disturbing aspect of the marketing process was the
widespread use of sight-unseen sales tactics. Mail-order, buy-by-
telephone, and "sales party" techniques were viewed as enhancing
the opportunities for fraud and sharp practice.20  If a buyer must
rely on second-hand descriptions, he quite naturally becomes easy
prey for those who would lure him into a deal by means of half-
truths or omissions, not to mention lies. And, where a substantial
distance separates the potential buyer from the property, he may be
more receptive (especially if his resources are limited) to sugges-
tions that the seller handle the "legal technicalities" of the sale.
Thus, not only may the nature of the land lie veiled behind the
seller's representations, but the process of acquisition and the qual-
ity of title may also be shrouded by the seller's unfettered control
over matters relating to transfer.2' Further, it was understood that
the sight-unseen problem, as such, did not depend on whether the
the continental United States." See 113 CoNG. REC. 315, 3529 (1967) (remarks of
Senator Williams).
17 1963 Hearings 203.
1 8 When introducing an earlier version (S.275, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), of the
Act in 1967, Senator Williams of New Jersey stated: "We are concerned not only with
retirement havens, but also with other kinds of promotion. Installment buyers, for ex-
ample, are now purchasing vacation lots, undeveloped 'investment acreage,' homesites in
developing communities, and even farmland . 113 CONG. REc. 315 (1967) (em-
phasis added).
19 It is noteworthy that an "urban proximity" exemption suggested in 1963 was
never incorporated into the Act. Compare 1963 Hearings 304-05, with 1966 Hearings
303-04.
20 1966 Hearings 46-51.
21 Id. at 46-50, 366-67.
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land and the purchaser were in two different states.22 Here again,
however, the focus of investigation, narrow at first, widened as the
hearings wore on. Several witnesses noted that on-site inspection
by a prospective purchaser might not, in practice as well as theory,
obviate the need for special protection where investment acreage or
subdivided parcels are involved .2  A first hand look, it was argued,
does not reveal the land's legal attributes, its hidden physical char-
acteristics, or its surrounding environment at times other than when
the prospective buyer observes it.24  Moreover, the inspecting pur-
chaser, frequently away from home and anxious to return, is more
vulnerable to the "make up your mind now" selling pressures of the
hustling salesman.25
A third factor troubling the legislative conscience was the land-
use planning problem raised by the ill-controlled marketing of
thousands upon thousands of subdivided parcels, many of which
were unfit for habitation either presently or in the near future. 8
When a large tract of marginal land is subdivided into hundreds
of small lots by means of the unimaginative grid pattern, a chain
reaction of planning problems is triggered. A tremendous demand
is immediately imposed upon local government for the speedy de-
velopment of proper drainage, sanitation, and roads, together with
adequate public utilities and facilities such as schools, police, and
fire protection. But the area generally does not have a tax base
sufficient to support such rapid expansion and improvement. This
unfortunate state of affairs may lead to haphazard and patchwork
community growth. It could also stymie development altogether.
And, worst of all, it is extremely difficult for a new developer to
reassemble the tract for some sensible use. The fast-buck devel-
oper, who originally subdivided the tract into thousands of non-
viable lots, has created a "legal wasteland 27 - a long-term dog on
planning for a high quality living environment.
Fourth, Congress apparently felt that something had to be done
to restore public confidence in the land sales industry. When Sen-
ator Williams introduced the first of the Act's predecessors in 1965,
22 1d. at 65-67.
231d. at 105, 131-32, 303.
24 1967 Hearings 167.
251964 Hearings 168.
2681965 REPORT 40; 1966 Hearings 44.
27 See 1964 Hearings 93, 157-58. "A situation therefore can develop which pre-
cludes use of the land by the small parcel owners; prohibits reassembly for either a pri-
vate or public purpose; and, indeed, makes it impractical even for agricultural pursuits."
Id. at 158.
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he sounded the theme, harking back to the birth of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the nadir to which public confidence in the se-
curities industry had fallen at that time. 8 The rationale was re-
peated by Senator Williams in 19679 and referred to in that same
year by Manuel Cohen, then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). ° Of course, the fear of waning public con-
fidence stems from a recognition of the fact that land development
will not proceed apace if investor interest flags.31 Implicit also is
the assumption that the business of subdividing and selling small
parcels of land is a national good, which is to be encouraged in its
most desirable manifestations.32 Hence the classic legislative di-
lemma: how to regulate an industry in order to save it - how to
accommodate the antinomies that result from a desire to purge
abuses, without, at the same time, imposing stifling regulatory bur-
dens.
The fifth factor at work in the legislative deliberations was also
based on the apparent feeling that mass marketing of lots in unde-
veloped tracts is, shorn of its reprehensible aspects, a basically use-
ful economic activity. Senator Williams, a chief exponent of fed-
eral legislation, was wont to point out how corrective laws would
place reputable and ethical developers on a par with the so-called
hucksters and bilkers.3 3 The rationale is that developers who use
full and accurate selling literature are put at a competitive disadvan-
tage because detailed informational material costs more to prepare
and because full disclosure gives the potential buyer a sporting chance
to bargain intelligently with the developer's sales agent - a circum-
stance that may require an extended selling effort or result in a lower
selling price.
The preceding array of industry ills and evils was in the fore-
front of the congressional dialogue which sprang to life in 1963
and came to fruition in 1968. Along the way, of course, the laws
already on the books had to be examined to ascertain whether re-
formulation of "on the shelf" nostrums might provide a cure, or
whether stronger (or at least novel) medicine should be developed.
28 Ill CONG. REc. 27,310-11 (1965).
29 113 CONG. REC. 315 (1967).
801966 Hearings 86.
3 1 See 1964 Hearings 2; 1965 REPORT 29.
82 1965 REPORT 29.
33 111 CONG REC. 27,311 (1965); 113 CONG REc. 3529 (1967).
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B. Existing Protections
1. Mail Fraud Statutes.- During the 1963 Hearings, repre-
sentatives of the Post Office Department described their line of at-
tack against fraudulent land sales practices involving the mails. 4
The two important weapons in the mail fraud arsenal are the crim-
inal sanction, providing fines and penalties for fraudulent use of
the mails,35 and the "fraud order" provision, which authorizes the
Postmaster General, upon a finding that the mails are being used
to conduct a fraudulent scheme, to direct local postmasters to inter-
cept mail addressed to the perpetrator of the fraud, to return such
mail to its senders, and to refuse payment of money orders and
postal notes drawn to the order of the violator.3 6  The mail fraud
approach to solving land sales abuses was thought to be deficient
in several respects. First, the mails, as contrasted with interstate
facilities, have to be used as part of the scheme. Second, a rather
specific intent to defraud must be demonstrated not only to obtain
a criminal conviction (as one would expect), but also to justify the
entry of a fraud order by the Post Office. 7 And, because consider-
able investigation must be made to build a case for specific intent,
the transgressing promoter may be able to strew a great deal of
wreckage in his path before he is brought up short. 8  Finally, it is
small comfort to a defrauded buyer that his seller has been fined
or jailed or that further mail solicitations have been blocked.39
2. Federal Trade Commission Act.- The Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) can proceed administratively against deceptive land
sales literature under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA).*4 However, regardless of how cogent the case for
provisional relief might be, the FTC is not authorized to issue tem-
34 1963 Hearings 235-58.
35 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
36 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964).
3 7 Reilly v. Pincuss, 338 U.S. 269 (1949). See also 1963 Hearings 239-45.
2 8 Senator Mondale (then Attorney General of Minnesota) in his testimony noted:
"Time consuming criminal investigations and prosecutions are not a total
.cure! Too often we are too late to prevent the victimizing of a large group
of our public. Even the preventatives of postal fraud orders.., do not pro-
vide complete protection. In the end it is little solace to the public who has
lost millions of dollars that the culprit is now in jail or, that he can no longer
operate under his present business label." Statement of Attorney General
Mondale of Minnesota, 1963 Hearings 301, quoting Remarks by Mr. Na-
thaniel Kossack, Chief of Fraud Section of Criminal Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, at the National Conference on Interstate Land Sales.
391967 Hearings 79-80.
40 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
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porary cease-and-desist orders to prevent the continuation of decep-
tive trade practices during administrative proceedings and judicial
review of final orders.4 1  Like the mail fraud statutes, the FTCA
process is not primarily prophylactic.
3. Federal and State Securities Regulation.- In order to in-
voke the protections of federal and state securities laws, it would
be necessary to find that land sale transactions are "securities."
Historically, except where state blue sky laws specifically refer to
real estate transactions, 42 the typical land agreement, at least the
non-installment type, has not been generally thought of as a secu-
rity.43 Notwithstanding, certain dispositions of real estate may in
fact possess all the elements of a security.44 While William Cary
and Manual Cohen, both prior Chairmen of the SEC, tended to
gloss over the possibility that lump-sum and installment land sales
agreements might well constitute securities under long-standing
criteria,45 it is likely that many of the transactions described at the
hearings were subject to existing securities laws. 46  For example,
certain lots were sold on the representation that oil explorations
were being conducted in surrounding areas.47  In such circum-
stances, it is likely that the purchase price included a component
which represented the future, but yet unrealized success of an enter-
prise over which the buyers of lots exercised no control. All the
indicia of a security are present in such a transaction, even where
the purchaser acquires an immediate interest in the fee. The same
analysis should apply where a developer sells a lot at a price which
is realistic only if he successfully completes all the improvements
which he promises for the entire development. Here, the initial
value furnished by the purchaser includes an element which is criti-
cally dependent on the success of the developer's own enterprise.
In other words, the developer is actually using part of the purchase
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)(C) (1964). See also 1964 Hearings 296; 1963 Hearings
287-92.
4 2 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Page 1964).
43 But see Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376 (D. Utah
1968), where, apparently, a lump sum land sales agreement was held to be a security.
44 See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 367, 386-92 (1967).
451967 Hearings 51; 1966 Hearings 85; 1963 Hearings 487.
461966 Hearings 367-68; 1964 Hearings 326.
47 1966 Hearings 39.
4 8 See Coffey, supra note 44, at 391-92. See also 1 L. Loss, SECUEITIES REGULA-
TION 491-92 (2d ed. 1961), (Supp. 1969).
[Vol. 21: 5
FEDERAL LAND SALES ACT
price to finance completion of developments which will ultimately
make the lot worth what the buyer paid for it.
49
As for the so-called installment lot transactions, the testimony
revealed that buyers were actually acquiring very little more than
creditors' claims against the developers under the guise of multi-
payment conditional sales contracts. To illustrate: The buyer's
payments were not escrowed to guarantee their application against
encumbrances; no contract was recorded; no title passed until all
payments were made; the buyer was not entitled to possession until
final payment was made; penalties were imposed for advance pay-
ment; and no title search or insurance were provided for." Given
these terms, it is difficult to characterize the purchaser's payments
as much more than a loan to the developer. In essence, the devel-
oper is selling a debt instrument coupled with a specious commit-
ment to repay by means of specific property. Such a transaction
differs considerably from the installment sale of a residence, where
the purchaser takes possession of the property, and the entire deal
is viewed as a loan by the seller to the purchaser, with the vendor
retaining title as security for payment.51
It remains unclear just why Chairmen Cary and Cohen gave
such short shrift to the possible applicability of the securities laws
to certain sales of lots, but their views can in no way remove the
likelihood that such laws will continue to hang threateningly above
the heads of those who peddle lots in a manner that calls for secu-
rities law protection. Thus, with the advent of the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act, certain developers may face double com-
pliance requirements at the federal level.5 2 Moreover, it is unlikely
that registration under the Securities Act of 1933 will satisfy the
requirements of the Land Sales Act, or vice versa, since the former
is aimed primarily at disclosure of facts about the issuing enter-
prise (here, the developer), while the latter is concerned princi-
pally with facts concerning the land which the developer is mar-
keting. Furthermore, when lots are subject to both the securities
laws and the Land Sales Act, the developer will face a rather
49 0ne statement referred to sale of land at a premium as a "method of financing."
See 1966 Hearings 74, 362-66. Indeed, it appears that some lots were being sold at
1000 times their present value. 1963 Hearings 309.
50 1966 Hearings 46-50, 366-68; 1965 REPORT 30-36.
51 See Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L
REP. 5 92,417 (N.D. ill. May 21, 1969) (installment conditional sale of residence oc-
cupied by the purchaser held not to be a security).
52Perhaps dual registration will be required at the state level also, except in those
cases where the state blue sky law is the only vehicle by which land sales are controlled.
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frightening array of fraud remedies, each with its own peculiarities
of application and interpretation."
In any event, the Senate committees were not satisfied that ex-
isting securities laws could afford adequate protection in the land
sales context.
4. State Regulation of Lot Sales.- When discussing state land
legislation, a distinction must be drawn between "land contract"
sales statutes, which are directed toward regulation and disclosure
of the contractual and property relationships between the vendor
and vendee, 54 and lot sales regulation, which requires that the pros-
pective purchaser be given a complete picture of the land he is about
to buy. The latter type of state law is central to this discussion,
although it must be realized that the "land contract" brand of legis-
lation represents yet another form of regulation with which an
installment lot seller may have to deal. 5
In 1963, the existence of state lot sales legislation was spotty
and uneven, and remained so through the passage of the Land Sales
Act. Many states had no such laws, and those that did differed
considerably in approach.56 In substance and content, state laws
fell basically into three categories: those that required registration
of land information;57 those that required registration plus the use
of administratively approved selling reports (in which the state
agency might editorialize with respect to the quality of the land
offered) ;58 and those involving a combination of registration, use
of property reports (editorialized or not), and administrative power
to prohibit offerings which are not "fair, just, and equitable."59
Aside from the complete absence of legislation in certain juris-
dictions and the substantive variation among existing state laws,
there was the question of the extent to which a particular state is
able or willing to apply its laws when the land offerings are inter-
state. There is not much difficulty where the "situs" state, S (the
53 See text accompanying notes 274-379 infra.
54 E.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.01-.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1969).
5 5 FED. RES. BD. REG. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.12 34 Fed. Reg. 2002-11 (1969), will
also apply where the installment contract truly constitutes the equivalent of a loan by the
seller to the buyer. Id. § 226.2(z).
56 For lists of states and types of laws, see 1967 Hearings 218; 1966 Hearings 53-54;
1965 REPORT 38-39; 1964 Hearings 320-33.
57 See 1967 Hearings 218; 1966 Hearings 53-54; 1965 REPORT 38-39; 1964 Hear-
ings 320-33.
5 8 See 1967 Hearings 218; 1966 Hearings 53-54; 1965 REPORT 38-39; 1964
Hearings 320-33.
59 See 1967 Hearings 218; 1966 Hearings 15, 53-54, 120; 1965 REPORT 38-39;
1964 Hearings 320-33.
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state where the offered land is located), has a lot sales law and
where both the developer and the offeree are located there. But
even slight variants of this case - where the developer operates
from another state, D, or where the offeree is in another state, I -
raise problems of enforcement. ° At the other end of the spectrum
lies the case where the developer, operating from state D, makes
his offer of land, located in situs state S, to offerees located in in-
vestor state I, which is the only one of the three having lot sales
regulation. In such a fact pattern, I authorities will face the issues
of: jurisdiction for service of process; jurisdiction to regulate (with
its commerce clause implications); choice of law; full faith and credit;
and practical enforcement.61  This lineup of thorny problems caused
state authorities to cry out for federal legislation to solve the inter-
state puzzle. 12 While California and New York, for example, claimed
they had theoretical jurisdiction to regulate offers of lots emanating
from other states,63 they admitted that enforcement was a serious
practical problem."
The intricacies of state law applicability to interstate transac-
tions was further compounded by the peculiarities of the express
coverage of certain statutes. To illustrate, the Florida law was
applicable only to installment sales, not lump-sum purchases,6 5 and
the New Jersey law was specifically limited to sales completed
within its borders. 6
Two major uniform state laws were adopted67 in an attempt to
encourage passage of legislation by more states, attain uniformity
of substantive content, and unscramble some of the complexities of
interstate coverage. As of 1968, however, satisfactory progress to-
ward these goals had not been made - not, at least, in the opinion
of Congress.
Besides the rather substantial lacunae in state legislation and
the vexing problems of the interstate tangle, there is the question
6 0 For instance, property reports required by the situs state might not be used by the
developer when offering to residents of the investor state. 1967 Hearings 115-16.
6 1 See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 67-85. In connection with pending lot
sales legislation, Massachusetts authorities prepared an interesting and thoughtful
memorandum on jurisdictional problems. 1964 Hearings 312-33.
62 See 113 CONG. REC. 318 (1967); 1964 Hearings 254.
631966 Hearings 113, 121; 1964 Hearings 18-19.
6 4 See notes 60-61 supra.
605 1966 Hearings 36-37.
66 Id. at 47.
67 UNIFoRM LAND SALEs PRACTICES ACT, published in 1967 Hearings 229-53;
MODEL SUBDMSION SALES CONTROL LAW, published in 1964 Hearings 335-38.
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of the states' fiscal ability to administer and enforce lot sales laws.
The blue sky law experience has taught that the best state statute
may lie dormant without a well-financed agency to vivify it. The
same point was made with respect to lot sales laws. 8
And so, despite industry attempts to portray the state system as
an adequate source of protective legislation, the scene painted at
the hearings was at best clouded and ambiguous.
5. Industry Self-Regulation.- Whenever an entire industry
faces the prospect of sweeping new regulation at the federal level,
the traditional and inevitable response seems to be a request for
time to secure voluntary self-discipline. With respect to the Land
Sales Act, it must be said that advocates of self-regulation had more
than a sporting chance to initiate and establish industry standards
in order to head off federal legislation. Indeed, Congress played
a waiting game; five years intervened the commencement of hear-
ings and the passage of the Act. Yet, at both ends of that period,
the appraisal of industry efforts to correct abuses from within was
the same - a dismal failure.69  The more reputable operators,
while publicly disfavoring federal legislation, probably did not care
whether it was passed or not. They were informally furnishing
purchasers with full disclosure already. The less reputable pro-
moters, on the other hand, were certainly not willing to give up the
slick trade practices which enabled them to compete on a shoe-
string. Thus, the case of a house divided against itself.
C. Federal Regulation: What Form Should It Take?
From the foregoing, it is reasonably clear that in 1968 the time
was ripe for some kind of federal legislation. In all fairness, it
must be said that members of the senatorial committees, alarmed
by the testimony which they had heard, were nonetheless sensitive
to the policy arguments against regulative heavy-handedness in the
field of land sales. As already noted, they viewed the industry as
essentially beneficial to the economy.7° They heard again, almost
as an echo out of the thirties, the claim that the West would not
have been won had modern legal strictures then been in force.71
68 1967 Hearings 80; 1966 Hearings 15, 132.
69 1966 Hearings 62-64, 127; 1965 REPORT 42-44; 1964 Hearings 89-90, 285.
70 See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra. It is interesting to observe how hos-
tilities subsided when certain industry witnesses convinced senators that their testimony
constituted a good faith attempt to explain the risks and burdens of land development
and the necessity for leeway in marketing practices. See 1966 Hearings 221-37.
71 See 1964 Hearings 239.
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Moreover, they knew full well that state authorities were in a better
position to inspect and control the sale of land, simply because of
their physical proximity to the problem.7" However, it was equally
clear that there existed some very substantial justifications for addi-
tional action at the federal level. Thus, the question was: What
should the federal law look like? For those readers with securities
law backgrounds, the following will read (if the preceding has not)
like a page out of history, one score and sixteen years ago.73
1. Preemption vel non.- The land sales industry, as a sort of
rear guard action, took up the cudgel for federal preemption of reg-
ulation in the field. There were arguments for absolute preemp-
tion and, in the alternative, exemption from state laws for those
who complied with federal requirements.7 4 Absolute preemption
would have benifited the industry by establishing uniform compli-
ance and by removing the discomfiting uncertainties created by the
application of state law to interstate transactions. Preemption was
also urged on the further premise that non-preemptive federal law
would tend to lull state agencies into laxity with respect to their
own statutes.75  But Congress was sensitive to the factors militating
against a complete federal takeover. Whether the federal law was
full disclosure oriented or highly paternalistic (i.e., going beyond
full disclosure to allow administrative comment on, or prohibition
of, land offerings), preemption would have been a political impos-
sibility. Representatives and senators from states with highly reg-
ulatory legislation would not support federal preemption based on
a full disclosure philosophy.7 But if the federal law were itself
highly regulatory, preemption would be fought by members of Con-
gress from states having no laws, or laws requiring full disclosure
only.77
Thus, thoughts of preemption were repressed, indicating, per-
haps, that the concept of the states as laboratories for local experi-
ment is alive and reasonably well - at least in the land sales area.
2. Full Disclosure Versus Paternalism.- Led by New Jersey's
Senator Williams, the proponents of substantial new legislation
showed a marked predilection for full disclosure rather than pater-
nalism. Under the full disclosure philosophy, it is enough to re-
72Id. at 168.
73 See generally 1 L Loss, supra note 48, at 121-28.
74 1966 Hearings 150, 205; 1963 Hearings 310.
751966 Hearings 173.
761d. at 119-20.
77 Id. at 161-62.
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quire a comprehensive informational registration, followed by ad-
ministrative processing of the information and a mandatory deliv-
ery of a complete and structured property report to potential buyers.
Unlike the paternalistic approach, there is no need for the agency
to interject its own evaluation of the land. Even less is there need
for administrative power to prohibit offerings when they are
thought to be "unfair," though not fraudulent. Light the thresh-
old, but don't lock the door."' Inform the buyer fully and give
him liberal fraud remedies, but don't babysit with him.79
The considerable bias in favor of full disclosure (and against
paternalism) was supported and reinforced by Manuel Cohen, then
Chairman of the SEC. 0 When asked whether he would want the
power to editorialize on the quality of lots if his agency were given
charge of the Land Sales Act, Chairman Cohen responded: "We
would respectfully decline."'" Reacting to misgivings about the
adequacy of a property report not including "fair comment" by an
administrative agency, 2 Chairman Cohen stated that, if his agency
fell heir to administration of the Act, a meaningful selling docu-
ment could be prepared without resorting to paternalistic tech-
niques." In this regard, he referred to the SEC practice of requiring
the issuer to include an "introductory statement" or "poison para-
graph" at the beginning of its prospectus (a practice itself some-
what tinged with paternalism), where such issuer is unseasoned
and the security offering is unusually risky. 4  It is also important
to note that the SEC wields a fair amount of power over the con-
tent of a securities registration statement and the terms of the offer-
ing (i.e., it waxes paternalistic now and then) by means of its discre-
tionary power to accelerate the effective date of a registration and
its authority to grant exemptions.8 5
Still, it can be argued that full disclosure to prospective land
buyers by use of a prospectus-like selling document will not func-
tion as well as it does in the securities context. Unlike the typical
sale of lots, many securities offerings, before they reach the "pub-
78 1963 Hearings 191.
79 1966 Hearings 23.
80 1967 Hearings 51-52, 59.
81 1966 Hearings 99.
82 1967 Hearings 73-74; 1966 Hearings 30-31, 69-70.
83 1966 Hearings 97-100. See also Note, S. 275 - The Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERs L. REV. 714, 729 (1967).
84 1966 Hearings 99.
85 See SEC Rules 2 53(c), 460, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.253(c), 460 (1969).
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lic," filter through a superstructure of financial sophisticates (brok-
ers and dealers), to whom the maze of prospectus information is
presumably meaningful.8 6 But what of the securities offerings that
do not involve a large selling group or broad aftermarket - or
which do not involve underwriters or dealers at all? Are we to
conclude that full disclosure in these situations is useless? Prob-
ably not. The SEC certainly strives to make the Securities Act pro-
spectus a document meaningful to the average investor.8 More-
over, a prospectus regarding the character of land may not be as
complex as one referring to securities.
Finally, regardless of its effect on those who see or understand
it, a prospectus has an immediate purifying effect on the one dis-
closing. The thought of being exposed to the light of day, in
terms that even a few can decipher, tends to reshape one's notions
of what is ethical and what is not.88
3. The Securities Act Paradigm.- With full disclosure taking
an early lead in the struggle over philosophy and approach, Senator
Williams introduced, in 1965, Senate bill 2672,"9 which, to the
amusement of some and the chagrin of others, was simply a trun-
cated version of the Securities Act of 1933, adapted for application
to the sale of lots. Nor could its collateral ancestry be mistaken,
for it was explicitly described as paralleling and being patterned
after the Securities Act.° The bill provided two basic levels of
protection: first, liberalized fraud remedies; and second, a require-
ment for full disclosure (by way of registration and use of a pro-
spectus) far beyond mere avoidance of fraud, either in the common
law sense or within the meaning of the bill's own expanded fraud
concepts. Indeed, Senate bill 2672 so closely followed the Securi-
ties Act that the words "registration statement" and "prospectus"
were preserved as the designators of the two principal full disclos-
ure documents. 9 In 1967, the bill was succeeded by Senate bill
275,9" and, while some minor changes could be observed, the motif
was still Securities Act, vintage 1933.93
Of course there were objections. Land, it was said, is not like
8 6 See G. LEFcoB, LAND INANcE LAw 1178 (1969).
8 7 See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 46-54.
88 Id.
89 111 CONG REc. 27,310-13 (1965). See also 1966 Hearings 243-75.
90 Ill CONG. REC. 27,310 (1965).
911966 Hearings 91-100, 247.
92 113 CONG. REc. 315-24 (1967). See also 1967 Hearings 4-36.
93 113 CONG. REC 316 (1967); 1967 Hearings 2.
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securities. The purchaser of securities cannot see the enterprise
underlying his interest, while the purchaser of land can view and
touch his "goods. '9 4 Query, whether this is a realistic distinction?
What of those who buy sight-unseen in response to high pressure
sales maneuvers? And what of those who have the opportunity to
inspect raw land? Even an assiduous survey of a lot may fail to
reveal such things as quality of title, year-round environment, hid-
den physical characteristics, or the dependability of a developer
who promises extensive improvements. The kinship of raw land to
securities may be close indeed.
Industry seers portended great increases in the cost of land as
a result of federal registration and prospectus requirements. 5 But
SEC Chairman Cohen put the lie to these gloomy forecasts by not-
ing that legitimate developers were already preparing similar mate-
rials, either voluntarily or in compliance with state law.",
Alternatives were offered. In the name of "creative federal-
ism,'"1' it was suggested that federal criminal penalties be imposed,98
or state authorities be afforded the right to sue in federal court,
when state laws are violated in interstate commerce. 9 An addi-
tional proposal would have empowered a federal agency to proceed
against a developer who was violating a state law.100 However,
these options would have put federal decision-makers in the busi-
ness of interpreting, applying, and developing state law. Besides,
where no state law existed, the very gaps in legislation which
prompted congressional concern would be left unfilled. With re-
spect to the suggestion that state authorities be given a federal
forum for enforcement of their laws, there is always the problem
of the under-financed state administrator, who could not afford to
take advantage of the federal privilege. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, these alternatives lacked the badly needed preven-
tive mechanism of full disclosure and the opportunity for individ-
ual recovery. 1°1
In any event, in 1968, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
94 1966 Hearings 67.
951967 Hearings 160-61, 181.
961967 Hearings 52; 1966 Hearings 303.
97 1966 Hearings 116.
981967 Hearings 40, 219-20.
991966 Hearings 115-16; 1964 Hearings 27.
100 1966 Hearings 121.
101 1967 Hearings 55-57, 153-54.
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Act 0 2 was quietly passed, its striking resemblance to the Securities
Act still intact. The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) was made its guardian, and the Secretary forthwith
set up the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration to handle
matters of compliance.10 3  History had, in a very substantial way,
repeated itself, and the body of law developed under the Securities
Act (and, to some extent the Securities Exchange Act) was to be-
come apposite, more or less, to a whole new industry.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL MEANS
Section 1404(a) provides that it is "unlawful for any developer
or agent, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce,
or of the mails"'0 4 to dispose of realty in violation of the Act. This
language provides the jurisdictional base with respect to the re-
quirements of a statement of record and a property report, as well
as the antifraud provisions. Although it may initially appear that
the burdens of the Act may be circumvented by refraining from
the use of the jurisdictional means, it is apparent from the cases
interpreting substantially similar language in the Securities Act
that this would be a difficult and risky undertaking.
Clearly, the use of the mails, 105 telephone, 0 railroad, 07 an air-
102 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. 1969).
10324 C.F.R. §§ 1700.1-.85, 34 Fed. Reg. 5722-23 (1969).
104 Since section 1404(a) is the pivotal provision of the entire Act, it is set out be-
low:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any developer or agent, directly or indirectly,
to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce, or of the mails-
(1) to sell or lease any lot in any subdivision unless a statement of
record with respect to such lot is in effect in accordance with section 1407
and a printed property report, meeting the requirements of section 1408,
is furnished to the purchaser in advance of the signing of any contract or
agreement for sale or lease by the purchaser; and
(2) in selling or leasing, or offering to sell or lease, any lot in a
subdivision-
(A) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(B) to obtain money or property by means of a material mis-
representation with respect to any information included in the state-
ment of record or the property report or with respect to any other
information pertinent to the lot or the subdivision and upon which
the purchaser relies, or
(C) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a pur-
chaser. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a) (Supp. 1969).
105 Burns v. United States, 286 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1961); MacClain v. Bules, 275
F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1960); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
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plane, 08 or even one's personal automobile0 9 between states would
constitute the use of the jurisdictional means. However, the scope
of this provision may be considerably broader. Although section
1404(a) uses the term "in" interstate commerce, rather than the
more encompassing words "of" or "affecting," the operation of
this language has not been limited to the use of interstate facilities
across state lines. "Interstate commerce," when defined as "trade
or commerce among the several States, '"" ° has been interpreted to
include the intrastate use of interstate facilities, such as an intra-
state telephone call"' or the intrastate use of the mails.112
More specifically, section 1404(a) (1)"' makes it unlawful for
a developer to use the jurisdictional means "to sell or lease" realty
covered by the Act, unless a "statement of record" is in effect and
the prospective purchaser has been furnished with a "property re-
port." Presumably this provision encompasses more than merely
the use of the jurisdictional means in the act of selling or leasing.
There is a shift in language from "to sell" in section 1404(a) (1)
to "in selling ...or offering" in section 1404(a) (2)," 1 but the
modulation is readily explained by the fact that to include offers in
subparagraph (1) would prohibit the making of offers unless the
disclosure requirements were satisfied. This does not indicate an
intent to exclude from the disclosure requirements those transac-
tions which are not executed by the use of the jurisdictional means.
This same language, appearing in a similar context in the Securities
Act,"r0 has been interpreted to mean "in order to" and includes the
106 Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
870 (1961); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
107 Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
108 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
109 Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1961); MacClain v. Bules, 275 F.2d
431 (8th Cir. 1960) (use of interstate transportation inferred from personal delivery
from one state to another); Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th
Cir. 1957); Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960); Collier v. Mikel
Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1958).
110 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701(7) (Supp. 1969).
111 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F.
Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1963). But see Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc., 218 F. Supp.
473 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
112 Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942); SEC v. Bennett & Co., 207
F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1962); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939);
United States v. Alluan, 13 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Tex. 1936).
113 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(1) (Supp. 1969).
114I. § 1703(a)(2).
115 Securities Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1964).
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use of interstate facilities in the furtherance of the transaction from
its inception to its final consummation.'16
The scope of subparagraph (2) of section 1404(a), the anti-
fraud provision, is somewhat more debatable. Query: Does the
provision apply to transactions where the jurisdictional means are
used at some stage of the transaction but not to transmit the decep-
tive information; or is the scope of the section limited to those situ-
ations where an interstate facility is used to communicate the fraud-
ulent statements? The difficulty posed is relatively minor when
viewed in light of the clear purpose of the Act - to prevent frauds
as well as to compel full disclosure. A restrictive reading of this
section would lead to the anomalous result of confining the juris-
dictional base of the antifraud provisions to a narrower scope than
that afforded the disclosure provisions. Nor is there a serious
doubt as to the power of Congress to prevent the use of the mails
or interstate facilities for purposes which it deems contrary to pub-
lic policy." 7 Rather than invoking handy Latin aphorisms of statu-
tory construction or engaging in the futile effort of divining vir-
tually nonexistent legislative history on this point,"" it is probably
sufficient to note that in the securities context, where this issue has
116 United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
946 (1969) (mails used to transmit an offer and sales literature, to remit the proceeds,
and to confirm the transaction); Roe v. United States, 316 F.2d 617 (5th Cit. 1963)
(letter mailed to purchasers); Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th
Cir. 1957) (personal delivery of proceeds by means of interstate transportation); United
States v. Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("to sell" interpreted to mean "in
connection with," and includes the use of the mails to transmit an offer and sales litera-
ture, to deliver the securities after sale, to send a confirmation, and to remit the pro-
ceeds to the seller); Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (i#tra-
state telephone call to arrange a meeting; mails used to deliver payment to seller);
Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960) (seller induced buyer to drive to
another state for the purpose of being solicited); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D.
Colo. 1959) (telephone used to make an offer); Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F.
Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1958) (seller's transportation of buyers by automobile between
states at the negotiation stage); Dupler v. Simmons, 163 F. Supp. 535 (D. Wyo. 1958)
(telephone used for negotiations; mails used to remit payment); SEC v. Truckee Show-
boat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (newspaper containing advertisement sent
through the mails). See also cases cited note 112 supra.
3. See Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944); Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp.
571 (N.D. I11. 1963); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939). See
generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1519-28.
138Reference to the use of the jurisdictional means is contained in HOUSE COMM.
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF THE HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Acr 60 (Comm. Print 1968), which states that it is "un-
lawful for any developer or agent engaged in interstate commerce" to violate the pro-
visions of section 14 04 (a) (emphasis added). This is broad language indeed.
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arisen with respect to substantially similar language,"' the broader
construction has been adopted. 2 °
Finally, section 1404(a) provides that it is unlawful for a "de-
veloper or agent, directly or indirectly" to use the jurisdictional
means to violate the disclosure and antifraud provisions. Thus, if
a developer were to accept a purchase contract and mail a copy of
it to the purchaser, jurisdiction would be established. But, so long
as the use of the jurisdictional means is foreseeable and in the
furtherance of the transaction, it would also be sufficient if the
purchaser mailed the proceeds to the developer, 121 or even if the
escrow agent mailed the deed and payment to the proper parties. 2
Indeed, where payment is by check, it may be sufficient if the de-
pository bank used the mails in the collection process.2 3
19 Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(2) (Supp. 1969), with section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964), and Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the
SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
120 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
(intrastate telephone call to solicit purchasers); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961) (personal delivery by use of commercial airplane); MacClain v. Bules, 275 F.2d
431 (8th Cir. 1960) (delivery through the mails); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670
(9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961) (telephone call to arrange initial
meeting); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
925 (1954) (delivery through the mails); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261
(D. Colo. 1965) (incidental use of telephone by seller and of the mails by purchaser);
Belhumer v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964) (use of mails for correspond-
ence between codefendant sellers); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F.
Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (newspaper containing advertisement sent through the
mails); SEC v. Bennett & Co., 207 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1962) (solicitations by intra-
state use of telephone, intrastate use of mails to send advertising literature to confirm
sales, and by purchasers to remit proceeds); Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D.
Colo. 1960) (telephone call by seller to a third person for the purpose of having this
third person affirm the seller's good reputation to the buyer); Moore v. Gorman, 75 F.
Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (personal delivery via railroad). See also Roe v. United
States, 316 F.2d 617 (5th Cit. 1963) (use of mails after consummation of transaction to
reassure purchaser may be sufficient) (dictum). See generally 3 L. LOSS, supra note 48,
at 1526-27.
121 Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76 (8th Cir. 1959); Nicewarner
v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965) (ancillary use of mails by purchaser);
Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (check mailed to seller);
SEC v. Bennett & Co., 207 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1962); Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F.
Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960) (seller induced buyer to travel by means of interstate high-
way for the purpose of being solicited).
1
-
2 McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826
(1965) (foreseeable use of mails by agent); Sherwood v. United States, 300 F.2d 603
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 838 (1962) (use of mails by codefendant); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cit. 1961) (foreseeable use of jurisdictional means by escrow
agent); Burns v. United States, 286 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1961) (foreseeable use of mails
by partner); Danser v. United States, 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cit. 1960) (foreseeable use of
mails by underwriter for delivery to purchaser).
123 Little v. United States, 331 F.2d 287 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 834
(1964); United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 787 (1946); United States v. Reidel, 126 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1942); United States v.
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It should be abundantly dear that any attempt to avoid the bur-
dens of the Act on jurisdictional grounds would probably be unsuc-
cessful. From a highly theoretical point of view, one might
finesse the jurisdictional base if all the steps in an intrastate trans-
action were accomplished in person. However, the risk that the
purchaser might utilize the jurisdictional means, not to mention the
inconvenience of being foreclosed from use of the mails and tele-
phone, would render such a scheme impractical.
It is important to appreciate the precise function of the juris-
dictional provision of the Act. Congressional power to regulate
is established whenever the mails or other interstate facilities are
used in connection with an offer, sale, or lease of land. Regulation
is not dependent upon the relative locations of the offeror, offeree,
or the land. Thus, the requirement that interstate facilities or the
mails be used does not limit application of the Act to situations
where property in one state is offered, sold, or leased to persons in
another state."4 At the same time, it must be recognized that separa-
tion of the offeror, offeree, or the land by state boundaries may well
be relevant to the availability of the intrastate exemption discussed
later.1 5 In that context, the term "interstate" (the presumed logical
contradictory of "intrastate") depends upon the domiciles of the
parties and the location of the land. It appears, therefore, that there
is a tricky bit of equivocation lurking in the Act.
IV. THE REGISTRATION PROCESS
Section 1404(a) (1) makes it unlawful for a developer to sell
or lease a lot in a subdivision unless a statement of r'ecord is in ef-
fect and a property report has been furnished to the purchaser
prior to the signing of the agreement. Failure to comply with
these requirements may result in administrative action, 26 as well as
criminal 27 and civil' 28 liability.
Robertson, 181 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afad uzem., 298 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.
1962); United States v. Vidaver, 73 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Va. 1947). But see Kann v.
United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944). See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON SEcuuixiEs LAW 108-19 (1966); 3 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1525-28.
124 Congress knew full well that, by using the jurisdictional language of the Se-
curities Act, it was extending coverage of the Land Sales Act to transactions where the
land and the purchaser were either both in one state or separated by short distances. The
point was brought up several times. 1966 Hearings 67, 103-09; 1964 Hearings 73.
Senators Bennett, Tower, and Hickenlooper commented: "We want to point out our
concern, however, that the bill still deals with promotional plans not for the purpose of
selling land interstate." S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1968).
'
2 5 See text accompanying notes 223-49 infra.
126 15 U.S.C.A. § 1714 (Supp. 1969).
127 Id. § 1717.
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A. Filing
The statement of record, which must fully disclose all material
information pertinent to the offered land,'29 must be filed with the
Secretary.'l 0 "Filing" occurs on the date of receipt by the Secre-
tary. 131
B. Waiting Period
The statement of record is then examined, and, if it appears to
be free from defects, it automatically becomes "effective" on the
30th day after filing.' The Secretary has the discretion to "accel-
erate" the effectiveness to such earlier date as he may approve.13
Of course, it is too early to ascertain the details of administrative
practice with respect to acceleration, and no guidelines have been
established by regulation. 34  However, it may be speculated that
effectiveness will be accelerated to a date requested by the devel-
oper as soon as any deficiencies raised by the Examination Division
have been corrected. 3 5
The effective date may also be delayed under certain circum-
stances. If the developer takes the initiative to file an amendment,
a new waiting period commences and the statement of record does
not become effective until its expiration unless accelerated by the
Secretary.' 36 On the other hand, where an amendment is filed pur-
1281d. § 1709(b)(1).
129 The information required to be disclosed in the statement of record is contained
in section 1406, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1705 (Supp. 1969), and 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.20, .105-.110,
34 Fed. Reg. 5931, 5933, 5938 (1969).
130 15 U.S.C.A. § 170 4 (a) (Supp. 1969). More specifically, the Examination Di-
vision, Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration, Washington, D.C. See 24 C.F.R. §
1700.80, 34 Fed. Reg. 5722 (1969).
31 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 70 4 (c) (Supp. 1969).
13,2Id. § 1706(a). As is the case under the Securities Act, effectiveness is not to be
taken as HUD approval of the land offering. Nor is it to be construed as an indication
that the statement of record is true and accurate. Id. § 1716. It is a crime to wilfully
make a representation to the contrary, id. §§ 1716, 1717, and the Regulations require
that the property report bear a legend disclaiming HUD approval of the offering. 24
C.F.R § 1710.110, 34 Fed. Reg. 5938 (1969).
133 15 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a) (Supp. 1969).
134 The Regulations merely provide for acceleration with respect to sales in progress
when the Act became effective on April 28, 1969. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.40, 34 Fed. Reg.
5932 (1969).
13 This is the general practice under the Securities Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a)
(1964). See SEC Rules 460, 461, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.460, .461 (1969).
136 15 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a) (Supp. 1969). Similar language in the Securities Act
provided the vehicle by which the Securities and Exchange Commission was able to
gain additional time for processing the "registration statement," the federal securities
law analogue of the statement of record. When additional time is needed, it is obtained
FEDERAL LAND SALES ACT
suant to an "order" or with the "consent" of the Secretary, the ef-
fective date is not delayed beyond the end of the then running 30-
day period, and, what is more, it may be accelerated.3 7
If it appears to the Secretary that the statement of record or any
amendment thereto is "incomplete or inaccurate in any material
respect," the Examination Division, by sending a deficiency notice
to the developer, can suspend the effective date "until thirty days
after the developer files such additional information as the Secre-
tary shall require."' 138 Upon receiving a suspension notice, the de-
veloper has two options: He can contest the Secretary's deficiency
comment by pursuing his administrative and judicial remedies;'- 9
or he can comply with the order by sending the requested informa-
ion.
The question arises whether amendments filed to correct defects
in the original statement of record should be considered "additional
information." It appears that the power to toll the running of the
waiting period by a deficiency notice was designed for administra-
tive convenience. This power enables the Secretary to compel the
developer to supply any information which may be needed to verify
the accuracy of the statement of record, and it provides him with
sufficient time to conduct the examination.'4 ° In the event that
by way of a "delaying amendment," i.e., an amendment filed at the initiative of the ap-
plicant which starts a new waiting period. This informal procedure avoids the necessity
of resorting to the formal and time consuming suspension procedure. See SEC Rule 473,
17 C.F.R. § 230.473 (1969); 1 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 273. Since this Act, unlike
the Securities Act, provides for suspension of the waiting period upon the issuance of a
"deficiency notice" by the Division of Examination, see note 140 infra, the only situa-
tion in which a delaying amendment would be required is where the Division finds it
impossible to finish its inspection of the statement of record within 30 days.
'37 15 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a) (Supp. 1969). The same rule applies under the Securi-
ties Ac In order to obtain "consent" to an amendment, a written request must be
made. It is granted only pursuant to a specific order. 1 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 269-
70.
138 15 U.S.C.A. § 1706(b) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
139 Receipt of the suspension notice triggers the developer's right to request a hear-
ing which must be held (but presumably not completed) within 20 days of the receipt of
the request. Id. The Secretary's determination may be appealed to the court of appeals
and the United States Supreme Court. Id. § 1710(a).
140 Id. § 1706(b). Before effectiveness of the statement of record, the Secretary
does not seem to have direct authority to order a developer to supply "additional infor-
mation" pursuant to a deficiency notice. However, he can sue to enjoin the developer
from making sales in the absence of an effective statement of record. Id. § 171 4 (a).
Indeed, a recalcitrant developer might refuse to supply the requested information and
withdraw the statement of record. But see id. §§ 1714(b), (c), wherein the Secretary is
given authority to conduct investigations which he deems necessary for the enforcement
of the Act. By this route, the Secretary could probably obtain any information he de-
sires. Cf. 3 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1948-56. If the developer initiated a hearing on
the deficiency notice, he may forfeit his right to withdraw the statement of record with-
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the Examination Division does not need the full 30-day period af-
ter the developer furnishes additional information, the suspension
period may be shortened by acceleration.' 41 If the Secretary deter-
mines that a corrective amendment is necessary, he would presum-
ably notify the developer, and the amendment filed pursuant to
this notice would seem not to require extensive examination. If
the corrective amendment is considered "additional information,"
its filing would commence a new waiting period.' This, however,
would serve no administrative purpose and would needlessly post-
pone the date when the developer could make sales. Although
the Secretary might exercise his discretion and accelerate the effec-
tive date, this should not be necessary. The corrective amendment
should be considered an amendment filed pursuant to an "order"
of the Secretary rather than "additional information," thereby
avoiding the commencement of another waiting period. 4
Of course, if the phrase "additional information" does not re-
fer to - and therefore need not include - a corrective amendment,
there is the possibility that the statement of record may become ef-
fective 30 days after the filing of the original additional informa-
tion requested by the Secretary, regardless of whether a corrective
amendment was filed. However, if the developer failed to make a
corrective amendment as requested by the Examination Division
and commenced sales after the effective date, the Secretary could
initiate injunctive proceedings, 144 thus exposing the developer to
civil and criminal liability for having on file a false or misleading
statement of record145 or for using a false or misleading property
report.'46
out administrative approval. Cf. SEC Rule 477, 17 C.F.R. § 230.477 (1969); 1 L.
Loss, supra note 48, at 310-16.
141 15 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a)(2) (Supp. 1969); 24 C.F.R. § 1710.45(a)(2), 34 Fed.
Reg. 5933 (1969).
142 15 U.S.C.A. § 1706(b) (Supp. 1969).
143 Id. § 1706(a). There could also be acceleration to a point before the end of the
waiting period running at the time when such amendment is filed.
144 d. § 1714(a).
1-5 Section 14 10(a), id. § 1709(a), provides an express right of action for having on
file a false or misleading statement of record. Criminal penalties are found in section
1418, id. § 1717.
146 Section 1410(b)(1), id. § 1709(b)(1), creates a civil action for using a false or
misleading property report in violation of the general antifraud provision, section 1404
(a)(2), id. § 1703(a)(2). See also id. § 1709(b)(2). Criminal liability for willful vio-
lations of section 1404(a)(2), id. § 1703(a)(2), is possible under section 1418, id. §
1717.
[Vol. 21: 5
FEDERAL LAND SALES ACT
C. Post Effective Period
1. Property Report.- Although a developer may engage in
promotional activities at any time, he may not make sales unless the
statement of record is in effect.' 47 In order to consummate a sale,
the developer or his agent must furnish the purchaser with a copy
of the property report "in advance of the signing of a contract or
agreement."'148 Failure to do so gives the purchaser a right to res-
cission 149 or damages. 50  If the purchaser receives the property re-
port less than 48 hours prior to signing the agreement, he may
revoke his obligation within the next 48 hours.' 5 ' This right of
revocation, however, may be waived in the contract by a purchaser
who acknowledges that prior to signing he had received, read, and
understood the property report and had inspected the lot. 52
2. Post Effective Amendments.- Assume for the present that
the statement of record and property report were materially inac-
curate on the effective date. It is clear that in such circumstances
the developer, if sales were made after the effective date, may be in
violation of sections 1404(a) (2) (B) (sales made in violation of
the antifraud provisions), 53 1410(a) (sales made after the effec-
tive date where the statement of record was materially deficient
when it became effective), 154 and 1410(b) (2) (sales made by
means of a property report which misstated or omitted material
facts).155 Although the developer may be able to protect himself
from liability under sections 1404(a) (2) (B) and 1410 (a) by inform-
ing prospective purchasers of the error before sale,156 he could not
147Id. § 1703(a)(1). Earlier versions of the Act forbade the making of "offers;'
as broadly defined in section 1402(10), id. § 1701(10), before the effectiveness of
the statement of record. See 1967 Hearings 8; 1966 Hearings 247. See also text ac-
companying notes 169-83 infra.
148 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(1) (Supp. 1969). The contents of the property report
are specified in section 1408(a), id. § 1707(a), and by Regulation in 24 CF.R. §
1710.110, 34 Fed. Reg. 5938 (1969). The property report is actually a part of the
statement of record. Id. §§ 1710.20, .110, 34 Fed. Reg. 5931-32, 5938-39 (1969).
14915 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b) (Supp. 1969).
150d. §§ 1703(a)(1), 1709(b)(1), (c).
L51d. § 1703(b).
152 Id.
153Id. § 1703(a)(2)(B). For the full text of subsection (a), see note 104 supra.
154Id. § 1709(a).
155d. § 1709(b)(2).
156Under section 14 10(a), id. § 1709(a), the developer can exculpate himself by
proving that the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission at the time of the acquisi-
tion; section 1404(a)(2)(B), id. § 1703(a)(2)(B), requires that the purchaser rely on the
material misrepresentation contained:in the property report
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avoid liability under section 1410(b) (2) unless he filed a corrective
amendment to the statement of record. Even then he could avoid li-
ability only with respect to sales made after the effective date of the
amendment and where a newly corrected property report is used. 5'
Nor is it possible, by using an informally corrected property report,
to avoid liability with respect to sales made while a defective state-
ment of record is on file. The property report is a part of the state-
ment of record,' 58 and it must be used in its entirety.'59 Thus, if the
original property report contained a misstatement, it could not be cor-
rected by merely striking out the error; and, further, if material facts
were omitted, it would not suffice to attach an addendum. Sales by
means of such altered (and unlawful) property reports would un-
avoidably violate section 1404(a) (1).16o To avoid any further liability
of the sort already described (not to mention administrative as well as
criminal actions),16" the developer must file a corrective amendment
to both the statement of record and the property report contained
therein. Although there is no direct statutory authority for filing post
effective amendments to cover preeffective errors, the right and duty
of the developer to do so dearly follow considering the liability which
attaches if he is remiss.16 2
Assume now that the statement of record was free from defects
when it became effective but that subsequently a change occurred
affecting a material fact required to be stated therein. In accord-
ance with the policy of protecting purchasers through full disclos-
ure, section 1407 (c)163 requires that the statement of record be con-
tinuously complete and accurate. Further, it imposes upon devel-
opers the duty to promptly file amendments reflecting all material
post effective changes.'0 Upon receipt of such amendments, the
Secretary has the discretionary power to suspend the statement of
157 Section 1410(b)(2), id. § 1709(b)(2), does not afford a developer who sells by
means of an inaccurate property report a reliance defense.
15824 C.F.R. §§ 1710.20, .110, 34 Fed. Reg. 5931-32, 5938-39 (1969).
159 15 U.S.C.A. § 1707(b) (Supp. 1969).
160 Id. § 1703(a)(1).
161 Id. §§ 1706(d), 1714(a), 1717.
162 Section 1407(c), id. § 1706(c), seems to refer to post effective amendments re-
quired by post effective changes. However, section 1410(a), id. § 1709(a), clearly im-
plies that the developer should file post effective amendments to correct any error (pre-
or post effective) in the statement of record.
163 Id. § 1706(c).
164 Id. The amendment, like the original statement of record, becomes effective
30 days after filing, unless its effectiveness is accelerated. Id. § 170 6 (a). It is also sub-
ject to the deficiency notice process. Id. § 1706(b).
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record until the amendment becomes effective. 165 Alternatively, if
the developer fails to file a corrective amendment, the Secretary
may initiate suspension proceedings.' 6 Clearly, sales made during
a period of suspension would violate section 1404(a) (1),167 since
a statement of record would not be "in effect." However, regard-
less of whether the statement of record is suspended, if the post
effective change materially affects the content of the property re-
port, the developer would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed from
making sales until the amendment became effective, at which time
he could use a corrected property report. 6 8
D. Marketing Problems
There remains to be considered the point in time at which a
developer may commence his advertising campaign. Section
1404(a) (1)169 prohibits the making of sales or leases prior to the
effective date of the statement of record and unless the purchaser
has been furnished with a copy of the property report prior to sign-
ing the agreement. Unfortunately, the terms "sales" and "leases"
are not defined either in the Act or by regulation. Although these
words may include all the constituent as well as ancillary elements
of a transaction for the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional
base,170 this same language, as it pertains to fulfilling the disclos-
ure requirements, presumably refers to mutually binding contracts,
executory as to performance. Under this interpretation, developers
may engage in promotional activities prior to the effective date.
Read in this manner, the section differs substantially from its coun-
terpart in the Securities Act which expressly prohibits all promo-
tional activities prior to filing and allows only prospectus-type writ-
ten promotional materials to be used during the waiting period. 17 '
The objective of the Securities Act is dear: Even though no legally
165 Id. § 1706(c).
166 Id. § 1706(d). After notice, the Secretary has 15 days in which to hold a hearing
and issue an order. Id. The order is reviewable in the court of appeals and the Su-
preme Court. Id. § 1710(a).
167 d. § 1703(a)(1).
16 8 Because the statement of record was correct as of its effective date, the developer
would not be subject to liability under section 1410(a), id. § 1709(a). He would,
however, by making sales after a post effective change, but prior to the effectiveness of a
corrective amendment, be opening himself up to civil (both private and governmental)
and criminal fraud actions. Id. §§ 1703(a)(2), 1709(b)(1), (2), 1714, 1717.
169 Id. § 1703(a)(1). See note 104 supra.
3 7 0 See text accompanying notes 104-25 supra.
17 1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b), 77e(c) (1964).
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binding sales are permitted before the effective date, prospective pur-
chasers might, in response to selling pressure and personal proclivity,
become "committed" to buy. To inhibit the formation of these psych-
ological obligations before disclosure is available, sellers may not be-
gin their attempts to dispose of securities until after filing, and,
during the waiting period, may use only structured written materials
meeting statutory and administrative standards.'72
Congress has abandoned this approach with respect to land
sales, apparently on the theory that there is less danger of non-legal
commitment before a property report is shown to the buyer. The
wisdom of allowing a developer to conduct an unbridled sales cam-
paign before his purchasers receive a statutory property report (or,
worse still, before a statement of record is on file) is certainly open
to question. To be sure, the purchaser of land is quite unlike the
purchaser of securities in certain respects. In many securities dis-
tributions, a purchaser must make up his mind whether he wants to
purchase at the public offering price by (or soon after) the time
the securities go "out the window." Land, on the other hand, is
not distributed in a single "burst" of activity; rather, it is sold piece-
meal, over a longer period. Thus, in the securities context, the lim-
ited decision-making period, together with the concerted efforts of
the selling group to "find a home" for securities prior to the actual
offering of a new issue, supplies an apparent justification for more
stringent controls during the preeffective period. There is the fur-
ther likelihood that a prospective buyer of securities might hesitate
to withdraw his informal commitment to buy, once he has indicated
his interest to a broker with whom he regularly does business.
Compunctions over reneging on a deal, albeit not legally binding,
may not be felt by a purchaser of land who will rarely have repeated
contacts with his seller. However, these generalized distinctions
between securities and land, ostensibly valid on the basis of an a
priori analysis, may tend to fade and blur in particular cases. For
instance, an offering of lots may be advertised as containing a lim-
ited number of "superior" or "prime" parcels, sufficient to satisfy
only a small group of purchasers having the perspicacity to seize
the opportunity "while the supply lasts."'73 An offeree who is sub-
1 72 The wisdom of forbidding "gun jumping" offers (attempts to dispose of se-
curities before structured information is available to the public) has recently been re-
evaluated and reaffirmed. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 127-35.
173 Such tactics remind one of the methods used in the past by carnival barkers and
announcers for radio adventure serials. One of the writers, at least, recalls the days
when attentive, infant devotees of such programs as "Jack Armstrong" and "Captain
Midnight" were regularly admonished by excited voices: "Be the first on your block to
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jected to such a sales device may well believe that he must make his
choice while the time is ripe. Moreover, if significant selling pres-
sure is applied, the whole pattern is very much akin to the securi-
ties distribution. Congress, however, wisely or not, has chosen a
different tack for the land sales industry.
Had Congress intended to proscribe advertising during the pre-
effective period, it could have included the term "offer"'14 in section
1404(a) (1)175 as it did in section 1404(a) (2)178 with respect to
fraudulent transactions. The congressional decision to allow offers
prior to the effective date does not render the foregoing discussion
moot, however. Rather, attention is drawn to the need for vigilant
enforcement of the general antifraud provision of the Act, 177 which
applies to all oral and written representations made to the buyer
prior to sale, including those made in the preeffective period. Sim-
ilarly, the developer's freedom to "condition the market" prior to
the effective date calls for stringent enforcement of standards gov-
erning preparation of the property report. Indeed, it is the only
document which might counterbalance the effects of the developer's
own selling literature. Even when the language of the Act forbade
offers prior to the effective date, concern was expressed over the
need for a comprehensive, yet uncomplicated property report which
would maintain the equilibrium in the selling process. 78 In 1966,
SEC Chairman Cohen assured anxious senators that an effective
and intelligible property report could be produced with proper ad-
ministrative guidance and prodding. 7 Later, however, the Chair-
man suggested specific statutory authority to regulate all selling
literature.' ° Perhaps this could be accomplished under the general
rulemaking authority granted to the Secretary.'"' In any event, the
own a magic ring (or secret decoder, or some such thing)." It is not difficult to visualize
the real estate pitchman using the same gambit at a county fair, the only difference be-
ing that his line would read simply: "Be the first on your block."
174 "The term offer includes any inducement, solicitation, or attempt to encourage a
person to acquire a lot in a subdivision." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701(10) (Supp. 1969).
175Id. § 1703(a)(1). See also note 147 supra. The property report will -not, as
originally intended, serve as a "companion piece" to selling literature during the preef-
fective period. See 111 CONG. REC. 27,311 (1965).
176Id. § 1703(a)(2).
177Id. See text accompanying notes 336-63 infra.
178 1966 Hearings 24, 30, 69.
179 Id. at 98-99. Chairman Cohen mentioned specifically the use of the "poison
paragraph," wherein an issuer of securities may be required to state, succinctly and
prominently at the beginning of the prospectus, all unfavorable information about its
enterprise. Id.
180 1967 Hearings 53. It was not given.
181 15 U.S.C.A. § 1718 (Supp. 1969).
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Secretary can control preeffective shenanigans by using his discre-
tionary power to refuse acceleration when it is not in the public
interest.' 18 2
In conducting promotional activities prior to the effective date,
developers must be careful lest their advertisements rise to the dig-
nity of a common law offer, which, if accepted in writing before a
copy of the property report is furnished, would clearly result in an
illegal contract. Nor could this result be avoided if the developer
solicits written offers to buy during the preeffective period and then
accepts them after the effective date, since the purchaser would not
have received the property report prior to signing the agreement.
Thus, although offers may be extended prior to the effective date,
the risk that they may be accepted prior to compliance with the dis-
closure requirements will substantially circumscribe this practice.
A different problem is posed with respect to oral contracts. Al-
though the difficulties of enforcement raised by the Statute of
Frauds may be overcome by part performance, 183 it remains to be
decided whether the terms "sales" and "leases" encompass oral as
well as written contracts. If not - a very dangerous assumption
- then developers could make oral sales at any time whether or
not a statement of record was in effect. Furthermore, since there
would be no "signing," a property report would not be required.
However, where the oral contract is evidenced by a check signed by
the purchaser, the disclosure policies of the Act could be fulfilled
if it were concluded that the check, being essential to the transac-
tion, constitutes a signed agreement which pursuant to the Act
must be preceded by a property report.
V. COVERAGE OF THE ACT
A. Definitional Coverage
In general, the reach of the Act extends to "lots" in a "subdivi-
sion. ' "18 The term "subdivision" in turn is given a rather elaborate
definition. 18 Basically, a subdivision is "land which is divided or
proposed to be divided into fifty or more lots.., for the purpose of
sale or lease as part of a common promotional plan.":"' Thus, the
1821d. § 1706(a).
183 See generally 8A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4463 (1963).
184 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a) (Supp. 1969).
185 Id. § 1701(3) (emphasis added).
186 Id. (emphasis added). Earlier versions of the Act set the lot minimums at
5 and 25. 111 CONG. REc. 27,312 (1965) (five); 1967 Hearings 5 (twenty-five); 1966
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sale of a lot in a tract planned for a 50-lot breakdown would be
within the purview of the Act, even though the engineering and re-
cording for all 50 parcels had not yet been completed. Individual
parcels making up the 50 lots need not be "contiguous" so long as
they will be offered as part of a common promotional plan.187 For
example, two tracts of 25 lots each, though separated by many
miles, may be conglomerated and counted as a 50-lot tract for pur-
poses of the Act, if they are offered as part of a common promo-
tional plan. Furthermore, they will be presumed to be part of such
a plan if they are offered by a "single developer, or group of devel-
opers acting in concert," and are "known, designated, or advertised
as a common unit or by a common name."'8 " One can only specu-
late as to the rebuttable or irrebuttable nature of the presumption.
For example, if X offers 25 lots on each of two sides of town under
the single name Blackacre Estates, the courts and EUD should have
some flexibility in determining whether the Act applies. The phys-
ical size of each of the two tracts is not statutorily sufficient to
raise difficulties about the nature of the land and the possible need
for full disclosure through registration. Moreover, it may happen
that each tract lies within well-developed, low risk surroundings.
In these circumstances, the protections of the Act may well be super-
fluous.' 8 9
Similarly, it does not appear that contiguous parcels need al-
ways be counted together, if the lots contained therein are not to be
offered as part of a common promotional plan. However, if par-
Hearings 244 (twenty-five). The size requirement is, at best, merely a threshold at
which a prima fade case for protection is established. It is a rough gauge, based on
the general assumption that tracts containing more than a given number of lots will,
in their most frequent manifestations, have enough troublesome characteristics to create
a need for buyer protection. The premise was challenged by a witness before the Senate
Securities Subcommittee: "I ... would like to see some more work done on [defining
exemptions), and not just by changing the number from 5 to 25 or 50 or 300 or
what, because these birds operate in all numerical levels, so it has to be something
better than that for a definition." 1966 Hearings 70.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189The presumption, if irrebutable, might be circumvented by use of the specific
exemption granted to "the sale or lease of real estate not pursuant to a common promo-
tional plan to offer or sell fifty or more lots in a subdivision." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a)(1)
(Supp. 1969). But if, by dint of section 1402(3), id. § 1701(3), lots are deemed to be
in a "subdivision" (and therefore within the coverage of the Act) because they are
offered as part of a common promotional plan, how can the same lots be exempted from
the provisions of the Act, under section 1403 (a) (1), id. § 1702 (a) (1), on the ground
that they are not offered pursuant to such a plan? It is true that the definitional pro-
vision uses the words "part of" (section 1402(3)), while the exemptive paragraph uses
"pursuant" (section 1403(a)(1)), but it will be cutting a fine line indeed if such a slim
difference creates a distinction.
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cels are contiguous'90 and offered by a "single developer, or a group
of developers acting in concert," they are presumed to be offered
as part of a common promotional plan and are thus counted together
toward the 504ot minimum.191
B. Specific Exemptions
Section 1403 (a) exempts certain lots, offerings, and transac-
tions.'92 Among these are dispositions of land pursuant to a court
order, transfers of mortgages, the sale of securities in a real estate
investment trust, the sale or lease of real estate by any government
or governmental agency, the sale of cemetary lots, and transactions
with commercial builders.193  The rationale for these exemptions
is dear: Such lots and transactions are either essentially commercial
in character, adequately governed by other laws, or unlikely to
involve a home-building or investment acreage purchaser. How-
ever, it is evident that a developer could conceivably cast an ordi-
nary consumer transaction in the form of one of these exemptions
in an attempt to thwart the purposes of the Act. This possibility
was anticipated, and consequently the availability of any specific
exemption is conditioned upon the developer's not having adopted
an exempt form of disposition "for the purpose of evasion" of the
Act.' Presumably, the developer would have the burden of prov-
ing the applicability of an exemption, 9 5 including absence of eva-
sive purpose, but in the normal transaction this should not be too
difficult. Problems arise when it appears that a particular trans-
actional form deviates from usual business practices and bears little
relation to commercial realities. While Congress did not intend to
impose additional burdens with respect to the normal conduct of
these transactions, neither did it intend to allow form to reign over
substance. Thus, these exemptions should be applicable only upon
190 And one can only assume that "contiguity" may refer to having a common
planar point. Query, whether two plots, both having separate points in common with a
third, but not with each other, are contiguous within the meaning of the statute.
191 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701(3) (Supp. 1969).
192 Id. § 1702(a). The Regulations repeat the statutory exemptions and add others.
See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10, 34 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1969). The Secretary has exemptive
power for "subdivisions" or "lots" where application of the Act is not necessary "in the
public interest.., by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the
public offering." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(b) (Supp. 1969).
193 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a) (Supp. 1969).
194 Id.
195 At least if the securities analogy is followed. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 48, at
712-13.
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a showing that the form was consistent with normal business prac-
tices, and in this respect the burden of proof should not be severe.
However, when it appears that there has been a departure from ac-
cepted business behavior, the developer ought to explain his con-
duct clearly in terms of purposes other than evasion of the Act.
Section 1403(a) 96 also exempts certain types of transactions
which, unless carefully circumscribed, may provide developers with
a ready escape from the provisions of the Act. The first of these
is the rather curious specific exemption for those transactions ex-
cluded from the definition of subdivision.' 9 7  The exemption is
enigmatic because the Act applies only to transactions involving
lots in a "subdivision,"' 98 which is defined as "any land which is
divided or proposed to be divided into fifty or more lots, whether
contiguous or not, for the purpose of sale or lease as a part of a com-
mon promotional plan."'99 Nonetheless, section 1403 (a) (1) spe-
cifically exempts "the sale or lease of real estate not pursuant to a
common promotional plan to offer or sell fifty or more lots in a
subdivision," unless, of course, the method of disposition is adopted
for the purpose of evasion of the Act.200 Ordinarily, one would as-
sume that all transactions not covered by the definition would be
excluded without resort to an exemptive provision. E converso,
one would not expect that lots brought within the pale of the Act,
upon a necessary finding that they were offered as part of a- com-
mon promotional plan, could then be exempted on the ground that
they were not so offered. Even without the exemption, a devel-
oper who is marketing a tract composed of 20 lots (or, for that
matter, 100 lots not pursuant to a common promotional plan)
would not be covered by the Act. Unfortunately, there is no dis-
cussion of this point in any of the committee reports, nor was it
brought out at the hearings.20' Nevertheless, the restatement of
the definitional exclusion in the form of an exemption, subject to
the evasive purpose caveat, presents some interesting possibilities
for expanding the scope of the Act.
For example, suppose a developer owns a tract of land which
could be subdivided with equal convenience into either 30 one-
acre lots or 60 half-acre lots, and that he elects the former. Clearly,
196 15 U.S.C-A. § 1702(a) (Supp. 1969).
'971d. § 1702(a)(1).
1981d. § 1703(a).
199 Id. § 1701(3).
2001d. § 1702(a)(1) (emphasis added).
2 01 See note 189 supra.
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he is outside the definition of "subdivision. 2'0' However, unless
he can show that he did not have an evasive purpose, he would not
be entitled to the exemption. He could argue, with great logical
force, that he need not claim the benefit of the exemption (with
its "purpose" limitation), because he is outside the Act definition-
ally. That is, one need tackle the evasive purpose issue of the ex-
emption only if one cannot avoid the Act by not falling within the
definition of "subdivision." But such an analysis might very well
convert the section 1403 (a) (1)203 exemption into mere surplusage.
Alternatively, the two provisions can be read as being necessarily
interdependent, resulting in an exclusion by way of the "subdivi-
sion" definition only if the failure to fulfill the terms of the defini-
tion is not the result of an evasive purpose. For example, it was
early speculated that developers might attempt to bypass the Act by
blocking acreage into subdivisions of less than 50 lots to be sold by
separate but affiliated businesses. 04 If it were impossible to bring
such a practice within the coverage of the Act through a finding
that the affiliates are "a group of developers acting in concert,"205
then, as an alternative, the evasive purpose clause could be invoked
to prevent operation of both the definitional exclusion and the ex-
emption.2 °0
A second exemption applies to a subdivision where each indi-
vidual lot is five acres or larger in size. 20 This, indeed, is a devia-
tion from the policies of the Act. The evidence adduced during
the hearings tended to show that some of the worst frauds involved
the sale of "investment acreage. ' 208  In fact, one repeatedly con-
demned development was apparently marketed in two, five, and ten
202 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701(3) (Supp. 1969).
203 d. § 1702(a)(1).
204 1966 Hearings 304.
205 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701(3) (Supp. 1969).
206 And, of course, a common promotional plan could be found, notwithstanding a
failure to find that the affiliates were acting in concert. But the presumption of section
1402(3) would not be operative in this instance. Still a fourth method of blocking a
split-business ploy would be to consider all the lots offered by the affiliates as offered
"indirectly" by the common owners of the several businesses. Thus, such common own-
ers would constitute a single "developer" within the meaning of section 1402(4). There
might be some difficulty with this last analysis because the definition of developer
seems to assume the presence of a "subdivision." This would indicate that the defini-
tion of developer cannot be used to determine whether or not there is a subdivision.
But the same insoluble difficulty exists with respect to the definition of "subdivision,"
wherein the word "developer" appears twice.
207 1d. § 1702(a)(2).
208 See note 15 supra.
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acre lots.2"9 A subdivision composed of 50 five-acre lots would be
only three-eighths of a square mile - hardly beyond the capacities of
most developers. In subdividing such a tract, a developer might
be tempted to make all of the lots five acres or larger in order to
avail himself of the exemption. Indeed, he may have this flexibil-
ity because of the nature of the land and the character of the real
estate market. Furthermore, the unscrupulous developer who is
selling uninspected parcels may not even consider the topography
of the land in subdividing it. Thus, it is clear that, unless the eva-
sive purpose test is given substantial content, this exemption gives
the large tract developer the option of avoiding the Act simply by
creating large lots.
In other cases - where the land is subject to a zoning law spec-
ifying a minimum lot size - it may appear that the only way the
land can be marketed is in parcels of five acres or more. In this
situation, the exemption may not be objectionable assuming that
land subject to such restrictions is typically desirable and frequently
located in prestigious areas. However, such an assumption will not
always be verified, and, as indicated above, where the quality or
potential of the land is more doubtful and evasiveness can other-
wise be shown, compliance with the Act may be appropriate.
A third exemption embraces the sale or lease of a lot in a sub-
division where the purchaser or his spouse personally inspects the
parcel.210  The history of this exemption furnishes a provocative
study in the subtleties of the legislative process. Apparently, 'the
Act was created primarily in reaction to fraudulent sales of land
where purchasers were solicited by mail or telephone and did not
see the land they were buying. Recognizing the early congressional
preoccupation with sight-unseen sales, lobbyists strenuously argued
for a personal inspection exemption. However, this recommenda-
tion was not incorporated into earlier versions of the Act. While
the lobbyists may have been correct in their assertion that sight-un-
seen sales furnished the original stimulus for legislative investiga-
tion, it is equally apparent that the Act's evolving disclosure policy
extended considerably beyond the mere dissemination of informa-
2091966 Hearings 37-38. The California Real Estate Commissioner commented:
"Offerings of xecreational, agricultural, and purely speculative subdivision lots carry
the greatest dangers to the purchasing public." Id. at 120. It is also interesting to
note that this exemption did not appear in the earlier drafts of the Act and was incor-
porated, without explanation, in the 1968 version. 1967 Hearings 4-36; 1966 Hear-
ings 243-75.
210 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a)(10) (Supp. 1969).
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tion that could be obtained by personal inspection n.2 " By requiring
that purchasers be furnished with a property report prior to signing
a contract, the Act assures that purchasers will be exposed to infor-
mation which they need to know in order to make an intelligent
decision. The property report must include the following informa-
tion: (1) the extent to which a buyer is exposed to the risk of los-
ing his investment in the event of the developer's bankruptcy; (2)
the impact on the buyer in the event a blanket mortgage or other
lien is foreclosed against the developer; (3) the arrangements made,
if any, to assure the completion of proposed improvements; 212 (4)
the availability of such facilities as gas, water, sewage disposal, elec-
tricity, and telephones; and (5) the necessity for subsurface im-
provements or special foundations.2 13  This information is not dis-
closed by visual inspection. Moreover, even if the inspecting pur-
chaser requests such information, the developer may never give a
reasonably intelligible reply but may, instead, resort to the very kind
of evasive doubletalk which the Act was meant to prevent. 14  Since
an exempt developer is not even required to supply purchasers with
such information, severe evidence problems are presented in the
event of alleged fraud.
At any rate, during consideration of the Act by the Senate, Sena-
tor Fulbright (who incidentally was not a member of the commit-
tees which had held the hearings) introduced this exemption, which
strangely enough was substantially similar to one proposed by a lob-
byist.2 15 The amendment was passed with no debate whatsoever
directed to its merits. In assessing the congressional intent under-
lying the exemption, it should be pointed out that the Act was
merely one of 17 titles of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968,216 which was considered in its entirety by the Senate.217
211 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
212 On this point, one witness noted that the developer's diminishing cash flow in
the latter stages of development frequently makes it difficult for him to complete all
the improvements promised. See 1966 Hearings 168.
213 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1705, 1707(a) (Supp. 1969); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.105-.110,
34 Fed. Reg. 5933, 5938 (1969).
214 The policy deficiencies of this exemption are somewhat, but by no means wholly,
ameliorated by the requirement that the land sold pursuant thereto be "free and clear
of all liens, encumbrances, and adverse claims," except reservations for such things as
roads and utilities and liens arising from taxes and assessments. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702
(a)(10) (Supp. 1969).
215 114 CONG. REG. 15,270-72 (1968).
216 82 Stat. 476, published in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 547.
217 This followed its being reported out by the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency. S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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Subsequently, the entire Housing and Urban Development Act was
referred to Conference Committee to resolve the differences be-
tween the House and Senate versions.2 18  However, the report from
this Conference does not further delineate the purpose of the ex-
emption.
Throughout the hearings, it became quite evident that even the
"reputable" developers were using selling methods approaching
"high pressure" tactics. It is not inconceivable that even a cautious
person might have his doubts suppressed under similar circum-
stances. Indeed, one self-proclaimed ethical developer objected to
giving purchasers a 48-hour grace period in those instances where
the property report is received within 48 hours before the signing of
an agreement.2 19  Thus, while personal inspection may protect
against the more obvious frauds, this exemption seems to gloss over
the ingenious, subtle ones that can be equally devastating. It is
submitted that, if the full disclosure policies of the Act are to be ful-
filled, this exemption ought to be limited via the evasive purpose
test to those situations where the type of information included in
the property report is made available to prospective purchasers, or,
at the very least, where the purchaser is completely protected
against the risk of the developer's potential failures.
The doubtful value of personal inspection also underlies the
specific exemption for the sale or lease of lots "on which there is a
residential, commercial, or industrial building," or a sale or lease
which obligates "the seller to erect such a building thereon within
a period of two years."220 A partial justification for this exemption
seems to be that, when a purchaser is buying a house (as opposed to
a naked plot of land), he will likely take the time to inspect the
property.22 Once again, the basic premise of the exemption can rea-
sonably be disputed,"22 though it must be conceded that a home
buyer is not only likely to inspect his property but also to take addi-
tional protective steps, such as hiring a lawyer. As a theoretical mat-
ter, then, exemption for home-builder purchases ought to extend
only to those situations where the developer can clearly show that
his purchasers do not need the protections afforded by the Act. For
2 18 See H.R. REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 161-62 (1968). See also HOUSE
CoMm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF THE
HOUSING AND URBAN DEvELOPMENr AcT Olz 1968, at 59-60 (Comm. Print 1968).
219 1966 Hearings 103-09. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b) (Supp. 1969).
220 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a)(3) (Supp. 1969).
2211963 Hearings 304.
222 1967 Hearings 96-97.
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instance, he might show that he has made information available to
prospective purchasers which is substantially similar to that con-
tained in the property report. Alternatively, he might show that
since he has completed general improvements which are sufficient
for the needs of the development, there is no need for any detailed
information. In establishing the standards of proof in such cases,
it must be remembered that a statutory exemption also provides im-
munity from the fraud provisions, and a purchaser in a statutorily
exempt transaction is not necessarily more protected than other pur-
chasers. Under normal circumstances, lots are sold prior to or dur-
ing construction, and purchasers critically need information pertain-
ing to the developer's plans and particularly regarding arrangements
he has made to assure completion. They should be apprised of the
anticipated costs of completing all improvements (no mean sum in
many instances), should the developer fall upon hard times. In-
deed, the value of individual lots may be largely determined with
reference to a completed subdivision, since the worth of overall im-
provements accrues to the value of the lots. And it should not be
forgotten that the property report, by informing prospective pur-
chasers about the bad things of a development, serves to counter-
balance the seductive poetry of salesmen. As a practical matter,
application of the home-builder exemption according to the fore-
going analysis may be impossible, because it will be difficult to
charge the seller with choosing to sell lots with homes - rather than
lots without homes - in order to evade the Act. Nevertheless, the
Secretary should not hesitate to use the evasive purpose test, where
possible, as a device for requiring developers to shoulder a heavy bur-
den in demonstrating that they are entitled to such an exemption,
especially where the theoretical justification for dispensing with
compliance is not likely to be verified.
Finally, by Regulation, the Secretary has created an "intrastate"
exemption.2  It is interesting to ponder the reasons why this exemp-
tion was not contained in the Act. The first two versions of the
Act expressly provided for such an exemption, 22 4 patterned closely
after section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act.25 While the express
exemption was dropped from the Act as passed, its reappearance in
regulatory form may have been a response to certain legislative re-
223 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(l), 34 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1969).
224 1967 Hearings 7-8; 1966 Hearings 246.
225 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1964).
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marks which called upon the Secretary to furnish relief for intrastate
offerings.226
The initial query is whether the Regulation was legitimately pro-
mulgated.2  In adopting the exemption, the Secretary must have
invoked his rulemaking power under either section 1403(b)22 8 (re-
ferring to exemptive power in the case of small offerings or limited
public offerings) or section 1419229 (general rulemaking authority).
Section 1403(b), notwithstanding senatorial remarks to the con-
trary, does not appear to sanction administrative exemptions pre-
mised on the interstate or intrastate character of the offering.
Rather, it authorizes exemptions based on size (presumably money230
or the number of lots23 1) or the "limited character of the public of-
fering." This latter phraseology could quite reasonably be read to
refer to the extent to which the offering is public, i.e., whether the
lots, though many in number, will be offered to a relatively small
group. Actually, this interpretation is well nigh inescapable. The
same language appears in section 3 (b) of the Securities Act,23 2 and
there has never been a suggestion that it authorizes the promulga-
tion of an intrastate exemption by the SEC. That this terminology
was not meant to function as a basis for an intrastate exemption is
clear from the fact that it was included in the Securities Act, even
though that Act contained a statutory intrastate exemption.23 3 This
seems to suggest rather forcefully that the "limited character of the
public offering" phraseology describes something besides "intra-
state" character. This interpretative clash originated in the formative
drafts of the Land Sales Act. Evincing a clear parallel to the Se-
curities Act, the early drafts contained a specific statutory exemp-
tion for intrastate offerings. 34  These original drafts also included
220 S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 111, 199-200 (1968) (combined views of
Senators Bennett, Tower, and Hickenlooper); H.R. REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 161 (1968).
227 Whereas the proposed statutory exemption would have required a wholly inta-
state offering before the exemption would apply, regulatory exemption is now extended
where the offering is "entirely or almost entirely intrastate." 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(l),
34 Fed Reg. 5931 (1969).
228 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(b) (Supp. 1969).
229 Id. § 1718.
230 E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(k), 34 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1969).
231 For example, the situation where a developer currently intends to sell only three
of the 50 lots in his subdivision.
232 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964).
2331d. § 77c(a)(11).
2 34 See note 224 supra & accompanying text.
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the administrative exemptive power, 2 5 which certainly, in those
drafts, was not meant to authorize a regulatory intrastate exemption.
Thus, it seems quite clear that, by deleting the exemption from the
statute before it was passed, Congress left the Act with no legis-
lative exemption and with no administrative power to create one.
Of course, one could ignore the analogy to the Securities Act and
the draft history of the Land Sales Act, leaving the plain meaning
of the exemptive provision as the sole focus of discussion. How-
ever, as already noted, the words themselves do not relate well to
the notion of an exemption based on the intrastate nature of the
offering, unless one adopts the view that confining an offer to a
single state causes its "public" character to be "limited." This ar-
gument might have slight merit in sparsely populated states. How-
ever, as a general proposition, the thesis is considerably strained.
Perhaps authorization could be founded on the general rule-
making power of the Secretary.236 However, this line of analysis
runs seriously afoul of the maxim of statutory construction that Con-
gress, by expressly providing an exemptive power in one section,
implicitly excluded the inference of such exemptive authority from
other sections. It is true that section 1419 gives the Secretary power
to "classify, ' 23 7 but classification within the operation of the Act is
quite different from avoidance of its application.
If the intrastate exemption is eventually held invalid, some de-
velopers who have relied on it may find themselves facing a num-
ber of damage or rescission actions under sections 1404(a)(1) and
1410(b)(1) for failure to register.138  Unfortunately, the Land
Sales Act does not, like the Securities Act, provide a shield for those
who rely in good faith on rules and regulations promulgated by the
Secretary.23 9
Admitting, arguendo, the Secretary's power to promulgate the
exemption, it may be fortunate that it arose through the adminis-
trative process, because the Secretary did what the drafters of the
earlier versions failed to do: He framed the exemption so that it
applies only with respect to the registration provisions of the Act
and does not insulate qualifying developers from the fraud provi-
235 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(b) (Supp. 1969).
2361d, § 1718.
237 id.
2381d. §§ 1703(a)(1), 1709(b)(1).
239 Compare Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1964), with 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1718 (Supp. 1969).
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sions.24 0  Thus, with respect to this one exemption, at least, the ex-
emptive structure maintains its fidelity to the Securities Act philos-
ophy - not relieving the seller of his liabilities under the fraud
provisions simply because he need not comply with the plenary
full disclosure requirements of registration 241 This result would
seem to depart, however, from the expectations of the committees
who held hearings on the Act. They probably expected that this
exemption would provide immunity from the entire Act, just as the
other statutory exemptions do. The reason for total immunity un-
der the statutory exemptions is a matter for conjecture. When
Manuel Cohen, then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, testified, he urged that qualifying developers should not
be exempt from the fraud provisions, 42 but his efforts were in vain.
However, the Secretary apparently heeded the Chairman's sugges-
tion, at least with respect to the "intrastate" exemption.
The language of this exemption is fraught with troublesome
terminology which no doubt will produce more than a few inter-
pretative hassles. It states that "[t~he sale or lease of lots where the
offering is entirely or almost entirely intrastate" shall be exempt
from the registration provisions, subject to the evasive purpose con-
dition.
Initially, the "intrastate-interstate" concepts connected with the
exemption should not be confused with the similar-sounding no-
tions involved in the jurisdictional means context.2 43  The exemp-
tion may apply (i.e., the offering may be "intrastate") even though
the jurisdictional means (interstate facilities or the mails) are used.
The requirement of the exemption is that the promotional cam-
paign (as contrasted with actual sales) must not extend significantly
beyond the borders of a given state. The thrust of the exemption
is premised on the assumption that when land is being offered to
local persons, there is no need to require registration since they
would have the opportunity to evaluate the quality of the develop-
ment themselves.244 Query, however, whether this rationale is
sound considering that in many states a prospective purchaser might
240 24 C.F.. § 1710.10(1), 34 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1969).
241 See Securities Act §§ 3, 4, 12(2), 17(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, d, 1(2), q(a),
q(c) (1964).
242 1967 Hearings 55; 1966 Hearings 89.
2 43 See text accompanying notes 104-25 supra.
244 Since the exemption refers to the character of the "offering," the conclusion is
inexorable that the location of the offerees (not the ultimate purchasers alone) is critical.
See 1 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 655-56.
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have to drive several hundred miles to inspect his land. Moreover,
if land located in state X is offered entirely within state Y, the ex-
emption, on its face, would seem to be apposite.245 However, this
problem could be avoided by reading the exemption to apply only
when the offering is intra the state in which the land is located.2 46
The exemption does leave to the states the exclusive power to
regulate offerings taking place entirely or almost entirely within
their borders, but this justification is not without its difficulties.
For instance, suppose land located in state X is offered entirely
within that state by a developer operating out of state Y. State X
(which is both the investor and the situs state) might have a law
governing the sale of subdivisions. However, it may choose not to
enforce its law against the developer, either because it feels it lacks
jurisdiction or because it lacks the resources to police offers coming
across its borders. 24 17  To minimize this problem, the exemption
could be further limited to apply only when the offering is intra the
state in which the land and the offeror are located.24 8 All this
might be accomplished either by amending the Regulation or by in-
voking the evasive purpose condition on the exemption.
It is notable that this exemption, unlike its analogue in the Se-
curities Act, does not expressly require that the offerees be "resi-
dents" - a term interpreted to mean domiciliaries.149  However,
unless the exemption is limited to residents of some sort, it will be
possible to direct offers to transients and vacationers, who are not
localized in outlook and knowledge.
The foregoing discussion has stressed the notion that a broad
application of certain exemptions will result in an unwarranted de-
nial of the protections of the Act. Conversely, it should be noted
that the lack of an exemption does not deprive a developer of the
right to sell his land, but merely requires that he furnish full dis-
closure and avoid fraud. The vehicle by which these exemptions
are kept within bounds is the evasive purpose condition. The nor-
mal procedure for interpreting this phrase would be to refer to its
legislative history, but, unfortunately, this source is silent. Refer-
24524 C.F.R. § 1710.10 (1), 34 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1969).
246 Similarly, securities must be offered intra the state in which the issuer is doing
business in order for the Securities Act intrastate exemption to apply. 15 U.S.C. § 77
c(a)(11) (1964).
247 On the question of state regulation and the jurisdictional issues and inhibitions
involved therein, see text accompanying notes 60-68 supra.
248CI. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1964).
240 For a short but informative analysis of section 3(a)(11), see Sowards, The Intra-
state Exemption, 2 REv. SEC. REG. 922 (1969).
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ence to the original drafts of the Act reveals that the evasive pur-
pose clause was not inserted until the final version.250 The same
terminology appears in the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act,
which was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1966.251 Again the proceedings and the comments fail to pro-
vide any insight.252 Thus, the phrase is amenable to construction in
accordance with the general policies of the Act.
As an original proposition, the term "evasion" could be read to
convey the notions of "sole" purpose and a rather specific untoward
intent. On the other hand, it could be equated with the term
"avoidance," thus eliminating the elements of scheme, artifice, or
contrivance. The latter interpretation would seem to be preferred,
since, under the former, a developer could avail himself of an ex-
emption upon a showing of any legitimate business purpose, no
matter how obscure. The preferred test would require a developer
to show that his knowledge of the consequences of an exemption
did not materially contribute to his decision, i.e., that other legiti-
mate considerations were primarily determinative. In short, the de-
veloper would have to demonstrate that an exempted form was the
only practical way to market his land, or at least, that it was signifi-
candy more advantageous than a form which would bring the
transaction within the Act.253 Another more lenient formulation of
the evasive purpose test would necessitate a showing that avoidance
was not a dominant or principal purpose, i.e., that some legitimate
considerations were of at least equal importance.
In establishing the dimensions of the evasive purpose limita-
tion, the courts and the Secretary should remain mindful of the fol-
lowing: First, the denial of an exemption does not prohibit the
developer from adopting a particular means of marketing his land;
it merely subjects him to the coverage of the Act, thus affording
protection to the purchaser. Second, developers possess differing
degrees of flexibility in choosing the manner in which they wish to
dispose of their lots. Some developers may rather freely determine
the mode of marketing their land; others have little range of choice.
2501967 Hearings 7; 1966 Hearings 245.
2 51UNIFopm LAND SALES PRACrICES AcT § 3, published in 1967 Hearings 235.
252 Id.
253 By referring to "the purpose of evasion," 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a) (Supp. 1969)
(emphasis added), Congress could be held to have meant "any" or "a" purpose, and
not a sole or even dominant purpose. Cf. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297
(1969). In situations where a developer is in doubt about the availability of any ex-
emption, he can seek an "exemption advisory opinion" from the Secretary. 24 C.F.R.
§ 1710.15, 34 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1969).
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Third, the complexity of the decision-making process and the diffi-
culty of weighing factors which might influence the formation of
intent point up the need for objective criteria.
Finally, there is nothing in the Act to suggest that the evasive
purpose test must be used on an all-or-nothing basis. To illustrate,
where there is evidence of evasive purpose in connection with the
subdivision of a tract into 49 lots instead of 50, the courts and the
Secretary might take the position that the developer was exempt
from the statement of record and property report requirements of
the Act, but not free from coverage of the general antifraud provi-
sion.2 54
C. Coordination with State Compliance
The Act does not preempt the role of the states in the regula-
tion of subdivision sales.255 Indeed, the Secretary is authorized to
accept certain state materials in fulfillment of the statement of rec-
ord and property report filing requirements of the Act, if he finds
such action to be in the public interest and for the protection of
purchasers. -56  Thus far, the Secretary has made such a finding
with respect to California, Florida, New York, Hawaii, and Illi-
nois. 257  This approach, the reverse of the style of coordination prev-
alent in the securities industry,258 was apparently intended to en-
courage state legislation. 9  Whether the Act will actually stimu-
late state regulation is a debatable matter. Some have suggested
that it will have precisely the opposite effect.260
254 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(2) (Supp. 1969). In its penultimate version (S. 275,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)), the Act did not contain an evasive purpose limitation on
exemptions. Like the Act as finally passed, however, it did not specifically preserve the
coverage of the antifraud provisions where exemptions were available. Thus, S. 275
allowed no leeway for "splitting" the applicability of the xegistration and antifraud
sections, so that one might apply when the other didn't. This result was criticized on
the theory that the fraud section ought to be left active in many cases where registration
is excused. See Note, supra note 83, at 730-31. The evasive purpose circumscription
on exemptions could furnish the statutory handle for the desired flexibility of coverage.
255 15 U.S.C.A. § 1708(b) (Supp. 1969).
256 Id. § 1708(a).
257 24 C.F.R. § 1710.25, 34 Fed. Reg. 9757 (1969).
258 Where the use of federal materials is allowed as compliance with state require-
ments. See 1967 Hearings 59; UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 303.
259 Ill CONG REc. 27,311 (1965); 113 CONG. REC. 316 (1967).
260 It is argued that investor-only states would be happy to stay out (or get out) of
the business of regulating offers involving developers and land located outside their
borders, because such offers are primarily interstate and raise unwieldy administrative
as well as theoretical problems. See 1966 Hearings 52, 150. Situs states, too, might
be tempted to reduce enforcement of their laws when sellers and buyers reside outside
their boundaries.
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In any event, the coordination technique of the Act should re-
duce the cost of compliance somewhat-by eliminating duplicative
filings where the Secretary accepts state materials. Furthermore,
the Act does constitute an improvement over the approach taken in
the 1964 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.61
The Exchange Act grants certain exemptions for securities subject
to state regulations equivalent to their federal counterparts. 2  How-
ever, the issuers of the securities are left to guess whether the state
regulation is "equivalent enough. 263  Under the Land Sales Act,
a finding of the Secretary regarding the acceptability of state ma-
terials is authorized and required.
It is also fairly clear that the coordination process of the Act will
not accomplish the substantial monetary saving and uniformity that
would have resulted from federal preemption and that might have
accompanied a practice whereby state authorities could adopt federal
compliance as their own.264
VI. ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Violation of the Land Sales Act may expose a developer and his
agents to a host of sanctions - administrative, civil, and criminal.
Prior to the Act, federal jurisdiction over real estate frauds was as-
serted mainly under the mail fraud statutes, the FTCA, and the se-
curities laws.2 65 However, these avenues of attack were largely in-
effective primarily because of the time involved in obtaining con-
victions, the impotency of both the Post Office "fraud order" and
the FTC stop order, the total absence of private civil remedies, and
the general lack of prophylaxis.266  During the hearings on the Land
Sales Act, it was suggested that real estate frauds should be dealt
with by amending the mail fraud statutes and the FTCA rather than
by creating a new act. This was rejected. Instead, Congress passed
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act equipped with broad
disclosure and antifraud requirements to be implemented via its ex-
tensive enforcement machinery.
261 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1964).
262Id. § 781(g) (2) (G).
2 63 See 1967 Hearings 52, 57-58.
264 Unless, of course, the Act encourages many states to repeal their own land sales
laws.
26 5 See text accompanying notes 34-53 supra.
266 Id.
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A. Administrative and Criminal Proceedings and Actions
The Secretary is authorized to make investigations to determine
whether any person has violated, or is about to violate, the Act.26
For this purpose, he may subpoena witnesses, compel their attend-
ance and testimony, and require the production of records.26" If
a witness refuses to comply, the Secretary may seek a court order, a
violation of which may be enforced by contempt proceedings.269
Furthermore, a witness is not excused from complying with the or-
der of the Secretary merely by invoking the fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.27 However, if he is compelled to
testify or produce records, after invoking the privilege, he is immune
from criminal prosecution. 271 Nevertheless, he would not be im-
mune from civil actions for injunctive relief or damages based upon
such evidence. Thus, the Secretary may well utilize his investiga-
tive powers to gather evidence as an aid to defrauded parties, who,
individually, might not have been able to undertake this expensive
process. Most importantly, the Secretary may use such evidence to
commence an injunctive proceeding against persons who have vio-
lated, or who are about to violate, the Act.27 2 Moreover, a devel-
oper may be criminally prosecuted for willful violations of any of
the provisions of the Act or the Regulations, and upon conviction
fined up to $5,000 and imprisoned for five years. 3
B. Private Civil Liabilities
The Land Sales Act imposes liability on developers for a wide
range of deceptive conduct and provides remedies for purchasers in
a variety of situations. To enforce his rights under the Act, a pur-
chaser may select either a federal or state forum, since both have
concurrent jurisdiction. 4  It is probably more desirable to com-
mence such an action in federal court. Here, of course, one has the
advantage of nationwide service of process and broad venue provi-
sions which allow suits to be brought in any district where "the de-
fendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the
267 15 U.S.C.A. § 1714(b) (Supp. 1969).
268 Id. § 171 4 (c).
269 Id. § 1714(d).
270 d. § 1714(e).
271 Id.
2 7 2 Id. § 1714(a).
273Id. § 1717.
274Id. § 1719.
[Vol. 21: 5
FEDERAL LAND SALES ACT
district where the offer or sale took place." '275 The jurisdiction of
the federal courts is not affected by the amount in controversy or
the citizenship of the parties.27 6
Nor do the remedy provisions of the Act preempt the field; a
plaintiff may avail himself of "any and all other rights and remedies
that may exist at law or in equity" 277 - most notably, the remedies
provided by state statutes regulating the sale of land in subdivi-
sions278 and actions for damages or rescission based on common law
or equitable fraud. Because of the different types of relief al-
lowed, it may be desirable to base a claim on several different
theories of recovery. If successful, a plaintiff might, for example,
be granted damages under the Land Sales Ac 79 as well as punitive
damages based on common law fraud.
1. Common Law Fraud: A Basis for Comparison.- The full
significance of the Act's private civil remedies can best be appreciated
by comparing them with the traditional common law and equi-
table remedies. As will become apparent shortly, the normal ele-
ments of these actions have been substantially modified and in some
cases even eliminated by the Act.
In a common law fraud action, one would have to elect either
rescission, founded in equity, or the legal tort of deceit. Rescission
seeks to restore the status quo; a plaintiff must allege and prove
(1) a misrepresentation of (2) a material (3) fact (4) on which
he relied.2 0  In addition, the parties must be in privity of contract,
and the plaintiff must be able to tender the property. Moreover,
the party pursuing the action must be able to avoid the affirmative
defenses of laches, estoppel, waiver, and ratification.281  An action
for deceit, on the other hand, allows a more generous measure of
275 Id. On the meaning of similar language under the federal securities laws, see
Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2 7 6 Language virtually identical to section 14 2 0(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1719(a) (Supp.
1969), in Securities Act section 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1964), has been interpreted
as giving the federal courts jurisdiction "irrespective of the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties." Deckert v. Independent Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 289
(1940) (Securities Act § 12(2)); Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (same). See
generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 2005-07.
277 15 U.S.C.A. § 1713 (Supp. 1969).
2 7 8 In Ohio, for example, the blue sky law which regulates the sale of securities in
the stare defines the term "security" as including "real estate not situated in this state
and any interest in real estate not situated in this state." OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
1707.01(B) (Page 1953). See also text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
279 15 U.S.C.A. § 1709(c) (Supp. 1969).
2 80 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 471 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 8 (1937).
281 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS §§ 482-85 (1932).
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recovery and is not subject to the equitable defenses or the privity
requirement.28 2  In spite of its freedom from some of the impedi-
ments to rescissional relief, an action in deceit involves a more com-
plex set of elements: (1) A misrepresentation of (2) a material
(3) fact; (4) scienter (i.e., that the defendant knowingly made
a false statement to induce reliance); (5) justifiable reliance by
the plaintiff, (6) causing (7) damage; and (8) malice, if punitive
damages are sought.283  In view of these requirements the proof in
support of a claim for deceit is greater than that required to support
a claim for rescission. To obtain rescission, a plaintiff need not
prove a causal relationship between the misrepresentation and the
damage. Indeed, it is not even necessary that there be any dam-
age.284  Furthermore, rescission may be granted without proof of
the seller's fraudulent intent, but, if this fact is shown, materiality
need not be proven. 8 5
It is against this background of common law fraud and equi-
table rescission that the remedies under the Land Sales Act will be
analyzed. At the outset, it should be recognized that Congress felt
that the traditional common law and equitable remedies were in-
adequate in the land sales context."' Thus, powerful new anti-
fraud weapons were created. In addition, Congress provided new
mechanisms to enforce the full disclosure requirements of the Act
(i.e., those portions of the Act calling for disclosure over and above
mere avoidance of fraud). These devices operate to relieve a de-
frauded or uniformed party of many of the burdens he was sub-
jected to at common law.
2. Effective Registration Statement and Timely Delivery of a
Property Report.- The Act prohibits sales or leases of land at
any time prior to the effective date of the statement of record and
requires that the property report be furnished to the prospective
purchaser or lessee prior to his signing an agreement. 287  A viola-
282 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102 (3d ed. 1964). It is
sufficient that the plaintiff was one of the class of persons intended to be misled. In
addition, there has been a tendency to extend liability to those persons whose reliance
upon the representation may be reasonably anticipated, without regard to intent. Id.
283 Id. at § 100. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476, comment c (1932).
284 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 898a (1941).
285 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 470 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538,
comment g (1938). If the seller makes an intentional misrepresentation of a material
fact, he has the burden of proving that the purchaser did not rely on such statement.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 479 (1932).
286 See 111 CONG. REc. 27,311-12 (1965); 1965 REPORT 30-36; 1963 Hearings
235; 113 CONG. REC. 315, 3529 (1967); 1966 Hearings 68, 79-80, 221.
287 Section 1404(a) (1) makes it unlawful for any developer or agent "to sell or lease
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tion of these provisions entitles the purchaser or lessee to either re-
scission or damages.28
If the prospective purchaser signs the contract prior to receiving
a copy of the property report, his right to rescind the contract is ab-
solute.289 The absence of statutory affirmative defenses in favor
of the developer (except for a statute of limitations) gives the pur-
chaser an exclusive option to exercise his right to void the contract.
Failure to deliver the property report is the gravamen of the offense.
The purchaser, therefore, need not prove anything more than the
fact that he signed the contract before he received the property
report. None of the other elements which are essential to recovery
under other provisions of the Act or at common law are relevant.
The exercise of this right provides the purchaser with a defense for
his failure to perform as well as giving him the right of restitution
in the event that he fulfills the contract. Alternatively, if the pur-
chaser should decide that he would rather retain the land, he may
institute an action for statutory damages.290
The developer does not fulfill his obligation merely by furnish-
ing a property report shortly before the buyer signs the contract.
Since a property report hardly performs its disclosure function unless
there is sufficient time to read and understand it, the purchaser is
allowed to rescind his obligation when the property report is fur-
nished less than 48 hours prior to signing the agreement, and this
statutory privilege must be expressly stated in the agreement. This
right, however, is only exercisable for 48 hours after signing,29' and
any lot in any subdivision unless a statement of record with respect to such lot is in ef-
fect in accordance with section 1407 and a printed property report, meeting the require-
ments of section 1408, is furnished to the purchaser in advance of the signing of any
contract or agreement for sale or lease by the purchaser... 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(1)
(Supp. 1969).
2881d. §§ 1703(b), 1709(b)(1), (c). Where the action is based on the non-effec-
tiveness of a statement of record at time of purchase, sections 1404(a)(1), 1410(b)(1),
and 14 10(c), id. §§ 1703(a)(1), 1709(b)(1), (c), are apposite. Although none of
these sections speaks of rescission, the use of the word "may" in the damage provision,
section 1410(c), would indicate that the equitable action of rescission is also available.
289 Section 1404(b), id. § 1703(b), provides: "Any contract or agreement for the
purchase or leasing of a lot in a subdivision covered by this title, where the property re-
port has not been given to the purchaser in advance or at the time of his signing, shall
be voidable at the option of the purchaser." This option is presumably enforceable
through section 1410(b)(1), id. § 1709(b)(1).
290 1d. § 1709(c).
291 Section 1404(b), id. § 1703(b), provides:
A purchaser may revoke such contract or agreement within 48 hours, where he
has received the property report less than 48 hours before he signed the con-
tract or agreement, and the contract or agreement shall so provide, except that
the contract or agreement may stipulate that the foregoing revocation authority
shall not apply in the case of a purchaser who (1) has received the property re-
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it may be negated if the purchaser signs a statutory waiver of the
privilege. 92 The foregoing provisions are applicable to both the
developer and his "agents. ' 293
3. False Statements of Record and Property Reports.- Sections
1410 (a) and (b) (2) set forth the enforcement machinery of the
full disclosure requirements of the Act.2 94  They are stiff relief
provisions meant to assure that the statement of record and the
property report are prepared with extraordinary diligence. They
impose liability if the statement of record, when it became effective,
or the property report, at the time of sale, "contained an untrue
statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact re-
quired to be stated therein [or necessary to make the statement
therein not misleading) .' 29 The quoted language deviates from its
analogues in the Securities Act 9 6 in one important respect: The
bracketed language was deleted in the Land Sales Act. Since this
language functions in the Securities Act to prohibit half-truths, the
omission could have seriously weakened the Land Sales Act. How-
ever, pursuant to his authority to specify the content of statements
of record and property reports, 297 the Secretary has incorporated the
bracketed language in his Regulations. 29
Reading sections 1410 (a) and 1410(b) (2) in conjunction with
the itemized disclosure requirements of the Act and the regula-
port and inspected the lot to be purchased or leased in advance of signing the
contract or agreement, and (2) acknowledges by his signature that he has made
such inspection and has read and understood such report.
292 1d.
2931d. §§ 1703(a)(1), 1709(b)(1). See section 1402(5), id. § 1701(5), for the
definition of "agent." Query, whether a paid publisher of advertisements is the agent
of the developer.
294 The section provides in part:
(a) Where any part of the statement of record, when such part became ef-
fective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein, any person acquiring a lot in the
subdivision covered by such statement of record from the developer or his
agent during such period the statement remains uncorrected (unless it is
proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omis-
sion) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction
sue the developer. (b) Any developer or agent, who sells or leases a lot in a
subdivision ... (2) by means of a property report which contained an un-
true statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact required
to be stated therein, may be sued by the purchaser of such lot. Id. §§ 1709(a),
(b)(2) (emphasis added).
2951d. § 1709(b)(2).
296 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771(2) (1964).
297 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1705(12), 1707(a) (Supp. 1969).
29824 C.F.R. § 1710.105, 34 Fed. Reg. 5933 (1969).
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tions, 29 9 a developer is under a duty to avoid the use of patent fal-
sities and half-truths. Furthermore, he is under an affirmative duty
to disclose specifically designated items of information. In this
latter respect, the Act imposes duties in excess of those prevailing
at common law. Traditionally, actionable misrepresentations have
included, in addition to outright lies,300 half-truths (i.e., those state-
ments which are true as far as they go, but are misleading because
of the absence of pertinent qualifications) and ambiguous state-
ments (i.e., those which are capable of two interpretations, one
true and the other false),30' However, there was no liability for
omissions, except where there was a duty of disclosure based upon a
fiduciary relationship, an implied representation of fair dealing, su-
perior access to information, or a statutory requirement. 02
Just as the Act and Regulations require disclosure of informa-
tion which would probably not have been required at common law,
in certain cases the general notions of the common law may be in-
voked to impose a duty to disclose matters not expressly required
to be mentioned in itemized schedules. Although the itemized
requirements are quite comprehensive, they are not exhaustive. In-
deed, it is entirely conceivable that developers may possess material
information which is not specifically enumerated. In these in-
stances, recourse may be had to the common law, where sellers of
real estate are under an affirmative duty to disclose in several situ-
ations: where the seller has superior knowledge of extraordi-
nary conditions; where the seller knows facts which the purchaser
has no reasonable means of discovering; where the seller discov-
ered information by undertaking an investigation, even though
there was no initial need to investigate; and where the purchaser
does not have an opportunity to acquire information, such as con-
cealed facts known to the seller.30 Disclosure of these types of
299 15 U.S.C. §§ 1705, 1707 (Supp. 1969); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.20, .105, .110, 34
Fed. Reg. 5931-32, 5933-39 (1969).
30 0 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 527 (1938).
301 Id. § 529.
30 2 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS § 472 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF RESTTUTION
§ 8, comment b (1937); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551 (1938).
303 For cases holding that a seller of real estate committed actionable fraud by fail-
ing to disclose subsurface defects which were known to him and where such informa-
tion was not reasonably available to the purchaser, see Buist v. Dudley DeVelbiss Corp.,
182 Cal. App. 2d 671, 6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1960) (failed to disclose that the lot was
known to be in an area of underground water and in an area of an ancient slide);
Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 152 Cal. App. 2d 671, 313 P.2d 132 (1957); Coen v.
Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 336 (1960); Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135
So. 2d 876 (Dist. Ct. Fla. 1961); Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d
454 (1960). For additional cases construing the scope of common law fraud, see Gil-
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data in the statement of record and property report may be required
by sections 1410(a) and 1410(b)(2) on the ground that they are
matters "required to be stated therein." Such a construction would
be in line with Congress' concern over "omissions" 30 4 and clearly
recognizes that duties of disclosure may arise from sources of law
independent of the express requirements of the Act. 05
In the event of an omission, the question arises whether the de-
veloper should be held liable when the failure to disclose was inno-
cent rather than negligent or intentional. This consideration raises
the problem of scienter, an element essential to recovery for com-
mon law deceit.3 06 With respect to the itemized disclosure require-
ments of the Act, the issue is irrelevant since sections 1410(a) and
(b) (2) make no reference to the element of intent.10 7  To the ex-
tent that the Act requires itemized disclosure of specific facts, the
developer is under an absolute duty to provide accurate information.
He is responsible for undertaking investigations to ascertain these
facts, and, to the extent that he makes affirmative representations,
he is held absolutely accountable. If a developer states that he has
bert v. Corlett, 171 Cal. App. 2d 116, 339 P.2d 960 (1959) (failure to make known
the content of an engineering report indicating that the property had little value due to
subsidence); Whiten v. Orr Constr. Co., 109 Ga. App. 267, 136 S.E.2d 136 (1964)
(nondisclosure of a large sewer on the premises, resulting in damages to the house
constructed thereon and to the land itself); Walsh v. Edwards, 223 Md. 552, 197 A.2d
424 (Ct. App. 1964) (failure to disclose liklihood of a nearby creek flooding); Gamel
v. Louis, 373 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
3
0 4 See note 286 spra. Cf. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (general antifraud section, such as section
1404(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703 (a)(2) (Supp. 1969), superimposed on itemized dis-
closure requirements).
305 Especially when the developer has engaged in a heavy selling campaign before
the effectiveness of the statement of record and the use of a property report. See text
accompanying notes 169-83 supra. The question of whether compliance with the
itemized disclosure requirements of the Securities Act avails an issuer of a safe harbor
or merely fulfills the issuer's minimum duty has not been resolved. See 3 L. LOSS, supra
note 48, at 1702.
306 At common law, a seller was liable for old style deceit only if he knew that his
statement was false and made such statement with the intention of misleading the pur-
chaser. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 526, 531 (1938). However, in an action for re-
scission, a seller was liable even for innocent material misrepresentations. RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 476, comment b (1932).
807 The scienter element was eliminated from sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1(2) (1964), and the defense of the issuer's due diligence
was substituted. Thus, most defendants under those sections were protected from liability
for nondisclosure of information which could not reasonably be discovered. See, e.g.,
Escort v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). However, even
the due diligence defenses have been dropped from the Land Sales Act. In this con-
nection, it is important to note that earlier versions of the Act contained virtual copies
of Securities Act sections 11 and 12(2). See 1967 Hearings 19-26. Then, suddenly,
present sections 1410(a) and 1410(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1709(a), (b)(2) (Supp. 1969),
were substituted, devoid of all the qualifying language contained in their predecessors.
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clear legal title to the property in question, he is held strictly to the
accuracy of that representation. If it later turns out that there is a
paramount title holder, the existence of which the developer could not
have ascertained by reasonable investigation, he is held liable nonethe-
less. 8" In this respect, the Act shifts the risk of loss to the developer.
The situation is somewhat different with respect to the incor-
poration of the common law duties of disclosure. If it is held that
the statement of record and property report must contain informa-
tion beyond the itemized data, reference should be made to the
common law to determine the scope of the duty to disclose such
additional information. 309 In common law deceit, the information
must be known to the seller and unavailable to the purchaser.8 10 If
the developer states that his information is based upon his own in-
vestigation, he will be held liable for misstatements resulting from
a negligent investigation, based upon the implied representation
that the investigation was undertaken with due care.311 However,
the common law does not hold a developer liable for not disclosing
information of which he has no knowledge, regardless of how sig-
nificant it may be. Moreover, it does not seem td matter whether
his ignorance stems from an actual failure to investigate or from an
oversight in a negligent investigation. In the securities cases, there
is considerable dicta which would impose liability, even in the
case of innocent or negligent nondisclosure. But this approach
seems to be predicated on the concept of corporate fiduciary duty,
particularly the presumption that corporate management personnel,
being in control of the corporation, are knowledgeable about the
business.312 However, in real estate transactions, this relationship
does not exist. Unlike his counterpart in the securities area, the
developer lacks physical mastery over the realty that he sells. There
are numerous latent defects that can only be discovered by expen-
sive and frequently useless surveys. The Land Sales Act should not
attempt to make the developer an insurer of the land he sells; rather,
it should seek to compel him to deal fairly with the purchaser and
30 8 It remains to be seen whether a developer can protect himself by making quali-
fied statements to the effect that no outstanding legal interests appear in its chain of
title, even though there may be such interests outside its chain of tide.
309 Since sections 1410(a) and 1410(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1709(a), (b)(2) (Supp.
1969), are so absolute in nature, it is arguable that only the elements of the claim and
defenses expressly stated therein should apply, even to the disclosure beyond the itemized
type specified by the Act and Regulations.
3 10 See cases cited note 303 supra.
311 W. PROSSER, supra note 282, at 724-29.
312 See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
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to place both the buyer and seller on equal informational levels by
affording the former access to the seller's information. Providing
the purchaser with such information enables him to make an intel-
ligent decision. If a destructive earthquake occurs because of a fault
unknown to the seller, there is no reason why the risk of loss should
be placed upon the developer. However, if the developer knew of
or suspected the existence and significance of the fault, he should
be held liable.
At common law, as well as under the Act, the facts which must
be disclosed completely and accurately are those which are material.
The significance of the data available to the purchaser is judged by
an objective standard reflecting the policy that facts which are un-
likely to influence average purchasers should not be actionable.
Imposing upon the seller the duty of ascertaining the accuracy of
statements about such facts, much less remembering to disclose
them, would be too great a burden. Thus, the law looks to that
faceless fiction - the reasonable man - to determine the signifi-
cance of particular facts. At common law, materiality appears to be
a rather stable concept. Essential to the right of recovery is "fault,"
a label which the courts are hesitant to apply, particularly in cases
of alleged fraud. However, by gerrymandering the scope of ma-
teriality, the courts can tailor the remedy to the situation. If a mis-
presentation is made with actual knowledge that it would be re-
garded as significant by a purchaser, it is automatically material.313
Otherwise, a fact is not material unless "its existence is a matter to
which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining
his choice of action in the transaction in question. ' 314 Although
this test is not as stringent as it might be, it does require a degree of
certainty that the facts, as represented, would ordinarily enter into a
reasonable purchaser's decision-making process.
This standard may be appropriate for purposes of the common
law, especially since it was designed to apply to a variety of situa-
tions. However, it is submitted that the policies of the Land Sales
Act require a broader standard. It must be remembered that this is
a disclosure-type statute which is designed to expose the purchaser
to extensive, but distilled, information. Its purpose is to place the
buyer and the seller on equal informational levels, and to provide
the purchaser with accurate information upon which he can base a
well-reasoned decision. Consequently, the Act should afford very
313 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2) (b) (1938).
314Id. § 538(2) (a) (emphasis added).
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little latitude for erroneous information, and the standard of ma-
teriality should be applied with this in mind. In formulating a cri-
terion, reference must be made to the type of person which the Act
was designed to protect. Is it a sophisticated businessman, an edu-
cated person, a speculator, or your Aunt Jenny? Most likely the
latter, particularly if she is elderly. 15
In answering this query, one can look to the groundwork laid
by analogous developments under the Securities Act. The SEC has
defined as material those matters as "to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing. 316
This definition and its application represent several substantial de-
viations from the common law standard. The language has been
variously interpreted to include: (1) those matters which an aver-
age prudent investor "needs to know before he can make an intel-
ligent, informed decision; ' '31 7 (2) "a fact which, if it had been cor-
rectly stated or disclosed, would have deterred or tended to deter
the average prudent investor;"'3 18 (3) any fact "which in reasonable
and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corpora-
tion's stock or securities;"31 9 and (4) facts "which may affect the
desire of investors to buy, sell or hold companies' securities. '320 Al-
though these constructions appear to be exercises in semantics, more
pleasurable perhaps to the philosopher than to the lawyer, they do
reflect a broadening of the range of materiality. Furthermore, the
reference point is not limited to persons of moderate financial in-
telligence. The Securities Act was created for the very purpose of
protecting those who lack business acumen.3 2' Thus, if Securities
Act patterns are followed, a developer will have to meet higher ma-
teriality standards under the Land Sales Act than he would at com-
mon law.
Reliance, an element necessary to traditional legal and equi-
table relief,3 2 has been eliminated as an ingredient of the claim
3 15 See text accompanying notes 4-12 supra.
316 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1969) (emphasis added).
3 17 Escort v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
318 Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934) (emphasis added).
319 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cit.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965) (emphasis added).
320 SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (emphasis added).
32 1 See 2 L Loss, supra note 48, at 849.
3 2 REsTATEM-NT OF TORTS §§ 525, 537 (1938); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTS
§ 479 (1932).
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based upon a defective statement of record or property report.32
Instead of requiring proof of reliance (i.e., that the buyer believed
and acted upon the statements of the developer), section 1410(a)324
shifts the burden, allowing the developer a defense by way of proof
that, at the time of the acquisition, the purchaser knew of the un-
truth or omission.325 This is certainly equitable, since it insulates
developers from liability for false statements of record where the
truth is revealed to a purchaser prior to the sale. However, as noted
below, section 1410(b)(2),326 regarding false or misleading prop-
erty reports, affords no such defense.
An interesting question arises with respect to the situation where
a false property report, which is part of the statement of record, is
provided to the purchaser, and, during the time prior to the sale, the
defect is corrected in the statement of record by amendment. If
the developer fails to inform the purchaser of the error or to pro-
vide him with an updated property report, would the lot acquired
be "covered by such statement of record, ' 32T if the amended state-
ment of record became effective prior to sale? If not, then recov-
ery may not be had under section 1410(a), and one must resort to
section 1410 (b) (2), which permits recovery where the sale is "by
means of a [false] property report. ' 328
Some significant differences between sections 1410(a) and 1410
(b) (2) ought to be elaborated. Section 1410(a) refers to the state-
ment of record, while section 1410(b) (2) extends liability to any
case where the purchaser is provided with a false property report.
Section 1410(b)(2) deviates from section 1410(a) and its counter-
part in the Securities Act, section 12(2) ,329 in one important re-
spect - the purchaser's knowledge of the truth is not expressly
made a bar to recovery. And it is clear that actions under subpara-
graphs (a) and (b) of section 1410 are separate and distinct, since
subparagraph (c) allows recovery for the "suit authorized under
323 The element of reliance was also deleted from analogous provisions in the Se-
curities Act Sections 11(a) and 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 1(2) (1964), require
that the purchaser not know of the untruth or omission at the time of purchase. Section
11(a) puts the burden on the defendant to show that plaintiff had such knowledge,
whereas section 12(2) requires the plaintiff to show he did not know. See generaly
3 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1702-04, 1725-26, 1729.
324 15 U.S.C.A. § 1709(a) (Supp. 1969).
325 Id.
32 61d. § 1709(b)(2).
327Id. § 1709(a).
3281d. § 1709(b)(2).
329 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
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subsection (a) or (b). '*"O Thus, a literal reading of section 1410
(b) (2) could result in liability where the purchaser is provided
with a false property report and is informed of the error, even
though such knowledge would bar recovery under subsection (a).
The omission of the "purchaser's knowledge" defense from subsec-
tion (b) is incongruous. The statement of record is in two parts:
The first is identical to the property report, and the second con-
tains additional information on file at HUD. Unless the purchaser
knows the truth, a material error in either of these parts results in
liability for the developer. However, if the error is in the property
report, and even if the purchaser knows the truth, subsection (b)
would allow the purchaser to recover. This is an absurd result to
say the least. The purchaser's knowledge should be a uniform bar
to recovery. A possible method of achieving this result would be to
read this defense into the "by means of" language of subparagraph
(b) - the argument being that the sale was not "by means of" the
false property report if the purchaser knew the truth. Alternatively,
it might be urged that the purchaser is estopped from asserting the
error since he knew the truth. However, such a reading of the
statute would import a reliance requirement which, in light of the
interpretation of identical language in the Securities Act, was not
the intent of Congress."'
Although the omission of the "buyer's knowledge" defense from
subsection (b) may lead to anomolous results, a developer can
avoid liability under either section by ensuring that the statement of
record and property report are both complete and accurate. The
stringency of sections 1410(a) and 1410(b) (2) - even, perhaps,
the latter's lack of a "purchaser's knowledge" defense - is a func-
tion of Congress' intent to force developers (and their agents, since
section 1410(b) (2) applies to both) to make accurate and full dis-
closure by way of a formal statement of record and property report.
The common law deceit element of damage-causation appears to
be missing from sections 1410(a) and 1410(b) (2). This is quite
understandable if one is seeking rescission. However, when dam-
ages are sought, the absence of the causation requirement would be
a bit more puzzling, were it not for the fact that section 12(2) of
the Securities Act,"'2 the counterpart of section 1410(b) (2), stands
330 15 U.S.C.A. § 1709(c) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
3 31 See DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968) (no reliance required in
Securities Act § 12(2)). See also 3 L Loss, supra note 48, at 1702-03.
332 15 U.S.C. § 77(2) (1964).
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as a legislative precedent for damage relief without causation. Sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act, the congener of section 1410(a), does
contain a "no causation" defense,'3 3 but the language underlying
the defense was not included in section 1410(a).
Finally, privity of contract appears to be a requisite element of
both section 1410(a), where recovery may be had by a "person ac-
quiring . . . from the developer or his agent,' 133' and section 1410
(b) (2), where the plaintiff may recover against the "developer or
agent, who sells" to him." 5
4. Fraudulent Practices.- Sections 1410(a) and 1410(b) (2)
are expressly limited to misleading statements of record and prop-
erty reports. They do not afford a basis for relief when misrepre-
sentations are made to prospective purchasers by means other than
these two documents. Since the Act allows the dissemination of
selling literature at any time (including that period prior to the ef-
fective date of the statement of record 336) it is apparent that a de-
veloper can fully condition his prospects by flooding the market
with selling literature, making speeches, showing movies, and utiliz-
ing high pressure sales tactics. By the time the statement of record
becomes effective, or at least when the property report is furnished,
the prospect may be psychologically committed to purchase land.
Even if the developer takes the utmost care in fully disclosing the
transaction in the property report and furnishes the document at
least 48 hours before the purchaser signs the contract, the policies
of the Act may be thwarted if there are no restraints on the devel-
oper's informal promotional campaign. This is particularly true if
the format of the securities prospectus is adopted for the property
report, in which case the latter may never be read. Even if the
property report is read, the gullible purchaser may already be per-
suaded by the illusions of paradise created by seemingly honest
salesmen.3 7
To a certain extent this problem is dealt with by section 1404
(a) (2) (B), which makes it unlawful "to obtain money or property
by means of a material misrepresentation with respect to any infor-
333Id. § 77k(e).
334 15 U.S.C.A. § 1709(a) (Supp. 1969).
335id. § 1709(b)(2).
33 6 See text accompanying notes 169-83 supra.
337 In 1967, even before the earlier versions of the Act had been amended to allow
offers during the preeffective period, Manuel Cohen asked for the power to promul-
gate rules controlling the seller's informal promotional materials. 1967 Hearings 52-
53. The power was never specifically given.
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mation contained in the statement of record or the property report
or with respect to any other information pertinent to the lot or the
subdivision and upon which the purchaser relies."""8 So far as the
reference to statements of record and property reports is concerned,
it appears that this section overlaps section 1410(a) and section
1410(b) (2). Moreover, because proof of reliance is required for
a recovery under this section, it is unlikely that resort-will be made
to it in such cases. However, this provision furnishes the only
source of recovery for fraudulent information transmitted by means
other than the statement of record and property report. Since it
prohibits misrepresentations, it is presumably broad enough to in-
dude half-truths as well as patent falsehoods, at least as this term
is used in its common law sense.
It is questionable whether section 1404(a) (2) (B) imposes an
affirmative duty of disclosure beyond avoidance of half-truths. It
appears that this provision was not directed toward pure omissions,
because of the incongruity of requiring proof of reliance upon an
unstated fact. It is unfortunate that the susceptibility of purchasers
may lead them to base their decisions on the advertising campaign
of the developer, completely disregarding the property report. How-
ever, it must be recalled that the property report is specifically
styled as a full disclosure-type document. This is clearly not the
function of advertisements. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that
Congress intended that each piece of selling literature and every
promotional speech should contain a full description and analysis
of all the material aspects of the development. It is the developer's
duty to supply the prospective purchaser with full, complete, and
accurate information. This he accomplishes by delivering the prop-
erty report to the prospect. So long as he does not provide mis-
leading information by way of his own informal selling literature,
the developer has fulfilled his responsibilities. It is at this juncture
that the responsibility shifts to the purchaser. Congress intended
only that the purchaser should have ready access to the property re-
port information; there is no reason to believe that it intended that
the developer should force feed him. Had it meant to do so, Con-
gress could have followed the pattern set forth in the Securities Act
which prohibits all advertising during the prefiling period and re-
quires that only prospectus-type written material be used prior to ef-
fective date.389
33815 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
839 Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
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This does not mean, however, that there are no additional re-
straints on the developer beyond meeting the formal disclosure re-
quirements of the Act and being truthful in his own materials. Al-
though an unscrupulous developer may find consolation in the be-
lief that purchasers may not read the property report, he must still
contend with state legislation, which, in some jurisdictions, grants
administrative officials authority to prohibit offerings of lots if
they are deemed unfair.340 It is a fair guess that state administrators
will read the property report with care.
Section 1404(a)(2)(B), aside from prohibiting the use of mis-
leading sales literature, may depart from the common law by im-
posing additional restraints on the promotional campaign.
The fine art of "puffing" continues to be firmly protected by
the common law. The notion that one may freely express his "opin-
ion" in business dealings finds it genesis in the age old concept of
"caveat emptor. ' '341 Rather than subdue the zeal of salesmen, the
common law allowed puffing as an established and accepted com-
mercial practice which purchasers ought to recognize and disregard.
Not being entitled to rely upon such statements, purchasers at com-
mon law were denied recovery. 42 The only exception is where
one "fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion or law
for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting in
reliance thereon. '34 3 In such cases, the purchaser is entitled to re-
lief, but the problems of proving the seller's knowledge and intent
are burdensome.
Modern developments under the Securities Act, which will prob-
ably serve as precedent for interpretation of section 1404(a) (2)
(B), have gone a considerable distance in watering down this ves-
tige of "caveat emptor." The SEC and the courts have shown a
significant intolerance for predictions about future market prices or
the profitability of operations. Liability for such predictions (if
false), even where they are identified as opinions, is almost as-
sured 44 Such things as valuations and geological reports are re-
garded by the SEC as based on implied representations that appro-
priate standards of investigation have been followed. Failure to
adhere to such standards by one who purports to be an expert in-
340 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.33 (G) (Page 1964).
341 See Note, supra note 83, at 717 & authorities cited n.21.
342 W. PROSSER, supra note 282, at 736-47.
343 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525 (1938).
344 See 2 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 143 7-38.
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volves a misrepresentation of fact.345 Along those same lines, a
developer's statement that lots in a subdivision will increase in value
may be equally prohibited under the Land Sales Act.34
It is submitted that in administering a disclosure-type statute
like the Land Sales Act no greater latitude should be allowed. Com-
mon law permissiveness assumed that buyers were possessed of an
unrealistic degree of sophistication. The fact of the matter is that
people are influenced by puffing, and it is consistent with the dis-
closure policies of the Act that purchasers should be entitled to rely
on the truth of such claims. Furthermore, it is safe to assume that
puffing is done with the hope that such statements will have an ef-
fect on the purchaser's decision; otherwise, why puff? In short,
puffing is an essential tool of the artful salesman - the anti-
thesis of full and accurate disclosure. Thus, when an affirmative
claim is made, such statement should be regarded as "fact."
In addition, a developer who actively discourages prospects from
reading the property report may well violate clauses (A) or (C)
of section 1404(a) (2), which generally prohibit deceptive business
practices.3 47  These provisions may be even more encompassing, and
might impose restraints on the use of some types of high pressure
sales tactics which compel the purchaser to make a hurried decision.
The exact dimensions of the duties imposed by this language are
not clear.348 As a theoretical matter, clauses (A) and (C) amount
to antifraud weapons when relief is not available under other pro-
visions. Translated, they mean: "Thou shalt not devise any other
cunning devices, '34' and their potential scope is limited only by the
ingenuity of scoundrels.
3.5 Id. at 1437.
346 Cf. SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969), wherein the SEC cautions that
"predictions as to specific future market values, earnings, or dividends" in proxy solid-
rations may be misleading depending on particular facts and circumstances.
347 Section 1404(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(2) (Supp. 1969), makes it unlawful
for any developer or agent "in selling or leasing, or offering to sell or lease, any lot in
a subdivision -
(A) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or...
(C) To engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or as a deceit upon a purchaser."
348 Although substantially similar language is contained in section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1969), the cases under these provisions have been directed toward limiting, rather than
prohibiting, certain types of noninformational conduct. For example, some securities
brokers engage in a practice of "churning," whereby customers are encouraged to fever-
ishly buy and sell securities. Of course, such activities generate substantial commissions.
However, a broker is not required to forbear such conduct; he is merely required to dis-
close its effect. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1479-81.
349 Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation, Before House Comm. on Internal and
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The disadvantage of having to resort to clauses (A) or (C) of
section 1404(a) (2) is that, by their terms, they bear a close resem-
blance to common law deceit,350 raising the possibility that the pur-
chaser will have to offer proof of the developer's intent. This re-
quirement is absent from the remainder of the Act, including (argu-
ably) clause (B). To what extent will the common law elements
of scienter (or, for that matter, the elements of reliance and damage-
causation) be engrafted onto section 1404(a) (2) ?
Perhaps the twin functions of section 1404(a) (2) have some
relevance. First, the section serves as the basis for administratively
prosecuted injunctive proceedings. 5' It is highly unlikely that
HUD, when seeking a preventive remedy, will have to show old-
fashioned scienter. Some watered-down notion of guilt, such as
negligent misstatement, may be sufficient.352 Nor will the Secre-
tary have to show the elements of damage, damage-causation, or re-
liance (except to the extent that he bases his claim on clause (B),
which expressly mentions reliance)- 3
Second, section 1404(a)(2) serves as the basis of a purchaser's
express private civil remedy in the form of either rescission or dam-
ages.154  As the source of a damage action, section 1404(a)(2)
might well be read to include the common law fraud elements of
old-fashioned scienter (actual knowledge plus specific intent to de-
fraud), damage-causation, and reliance. If securities law precedent
is observed, this will certainly be the case. Working with language
very much like that of section 1404(a)(2), the courts first inferred
private civil claims where none were expressly given, 55 and have
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), quoted in 3 L. Loss, supra note 48,
at 1424.
350 See text accompanying notes 280-86 supra.
351 15 U.S.C.A. § 1714(a) (Supp. 1969).
35- The same question has arisen under similarly worded statutes and regulations
in the federal securities context. Cf., e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 193 (1963); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
353 Cf., e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967)
(dictum). If the Secretary attempts to state a claim based on clause (B), he will face
the specific requirement that purchasers rely (or be about to rely) on false or misleading
statements. Reliance, however, will probably be limited to the "actual," rather than the
"justifiable," variety.
354See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1709(b)(1), (c) (Supp. 1969). Rescission is impliedly
available because of the permissive language in section 1410(c), id. § 1709(c).
355The language in section 1404(a)(2), id. § 1703(a)(2), bears a marked resem-
blance to the language of Securities Act section 17(a) and SEC Rule 10b-5, among other
securities fraud provisions. These were enacted originally for the purpose of defining
the grounds for equitable administrative actions, administrative proceedings, and crim-
inal actions. However, the courts have taken the initiative to allow private civil reme-
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since engaged in a seemingly endless struggle to explicate the ele-
ments of those claims. 56  The question of scienter alone has
spawned untold pages of judicial and scholarly commentary. 57
Should section 1404(a) (2) of the Land Sales Act lead to the same
imbroglio? The courts, if they choose, can avoid becoming em-
brangled in a discussion over the elements of a 1404(a) (2) action.
The way around the bramble bush requires an appreciation of the
fact that the troublesome private rights under the securities laws
are not express, but judicially inferred (statutorily implied).
Once the courts had breathed life into rights which Congress did not
explicitly create, they were left with the task of fashioning the di-
mensions of those claims - a chore which they performed par-
tially by looking to common law notions. Not so with section 1404
(a) (2). It is the basis of an express daim. The courts needn't go
beyond the face of the statute. If Congress had meant to include
particular common law elements, it could have done so. Indeed,
it did in one instance by requiring actual purchaser reliance in clause
(B). Under this interpretation, the issues of scienter, damage-cau-
sation, and reliance fade away, and the limitless embellishment proc-
ess is skirted. For clause (B), this easy course appears rational
enough. But how, in applying clauses (A) and (C), is a court to
determine, without reference to general fraud notions, whether there
is a "device, .... scheme," "artifice to defraud," or "transaction, prac-
tice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit" ?" A dilemma, to be sure; but a court faced with
the choice should think twice before it enters a labyrinth of statu-
tory elaboration such as that which lies beyond the portals of the se-
curities fraud provisions.359 A court opting to require a scienter ele-
ment need not, in view of the ambivalence of the statute itself, call
for the strictest kind of specific intent to defraud. Instead, such a
court could exercise a degree of creativity and allow recovery upon
dies based on these provisions. E.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp.
188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 38 U.S.L.W. 2175 (2d Cit. Sept. 9,
1969) (§ 17(a) ); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (Rule
10b-5).
a56or enlightening judicial comment on the extent to which common law notions
are to be incorporated into the so-called "implied" fraud remedies, see SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1968), cart. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
357 Compare Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cit. 1961), with Fischman v. Ray-
theon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Note, Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969).
358 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1703 (a) (2) (A), (a) (2) (c) (Supp. 1969).
319 See generally 3 L. Loss., supra note 48, at 1430-42, 1763-77, 1778-96.
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a showing that the developer or his agent perpetrated a negligently
fraudulent act. In view of the developer's right to conduct an all
out selling effort prior to the effective date of the statement of rec-
ord, a modified "fault" element, couched in terms of due care,
seems quite proper (i.e., if the decision is made to require such fac-
tor at all).
When section 1404(a) (2) is used as the basis of a rescission
action, damage-causation is no problem. But what of scienter? If
the courts look to traditional doctrines of equitable rescission, which
they might easily do under clause (B) (in which there is no deceit
terminology), the issue palls.360 Under clauses (A) and (C), how-
ever, where language of deceit abounds, the question is more diffi-
cult.'61 The case is reversed on the issue of reliance. Clause (B),
like the traditional action for equitable rescission, clearly specifies a
reliance element, while (A) and (C) do not. Since the function of
rescission is to restore the status quo where possible, a wise court
might, on a carpe diem rationale, choose its weapons from history,
requiring reliance (actual, if not justifiable) but ignoring scienter,
no matter which clause of section 1404(a) (2) is invoked by the
purchaser.
Finally, it appears that privity will be required as part of the
purchaser's case under any clause of section 1404(a) (2), since the
suit must be brought by a "purchaser" against the "developer or
agent who sells" in violation of that section.86 2  Indeed, newspaper
advertisements taken and paid for by the developer may well result
in liability for the publisher, since section 1404(a) (2) applies to
materials other than a property report and the term "agent" is de-
fined to include "any person who .. .acts for or on behalf of, a de-
veloper in ... offering .. . lots. 868
5. Measure of Damages in Private Actions.- At common law
the purchaser could recover for deceit only if he could establish a
causal connection between the misrepresentation and his losses. To
the extent that the losses were due to other facts not misrepresented,
the purchaser's right of recovery was limited.86 The Land Sales
Act has seemingly eliminated the damage-causation requirement,
making material misrepresentations actionable per se, similar to
360 See text accompanying notes 280-82 supra.
861 See text accompanying notes 279-81 supra.
862 15 U.S.C.A. § 1709(b)(1) (Supp. 1969).
8631d. § 1701(5). The agent, however, has a right over against the developer for
contribution. Id. § 1709(d).
364 W. PROSSER, supra note 282, at 747-53.
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the remedy of rescission.3 5 However, the measure of recovery is
still similar to that for deceit. Unlike rescission, where the plaintiff
is entitled to his purchase price only,8"' when the action is one for
deceit, there are two popular measures of recovery: "loss of bargain"
and "out of pocket." The former gives the purchaser the benefit
of his bargain, based on the difference between the value of the
land as represented and the value of the land at delivery.367  This
appears to be the rule in a majority of state courts. This measure
of recovery, however, entails a heavy burden of proof in the lot
sales context, because of the speculative value of undeveloped land
'as represented." 868  Congress chose to pattern the Act's damage
provision after the "out of pocket" rule, which permits recovery for
the difference between the purchase price and the value of the land
at delivery. 69 Unlike a tort action,87 0 the Land Sales Act does not
authorize recovery of interest or punitive and consequential dam-
ages. 17 ' The most that can be recovered is the purchase price of the
lot, the reasonable cost of the improvements, and court costs. Off-
set against this figure is the lesser of the value of the land at the
time suit is brought or the price at which the land is sold before
judgment.372  In a declining market, the developer is in a precari-
ous position. If the land was purchased for $10,000, and two years
later when suit was filed it was worth only $8,000, and possibly a
year or two later before judgment is rendered the land is sold for
$6,000, the plaintiff recovers $4,000. On the other hand, if during
the pendency of the suit the land should rise in value to $12,000,
the purchaser can sell it, take his $2,000 profit, and still recover the
$2,000 decline in value from the time of purchase to the time of
suit. The purchaser could recover $14,000 - not bad on an initial
investment of $10,000. Whether such a fluctuation will ever oc-
cur remains to be seen, but at least the possibility of reaping such a
865 Neither proof of loss nor causation of damage are required for rescission. 3 J.
POMEROY, supra note 284, at § 898a (1941). Here again, however, where a damage
action is based on section 1404(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1703(a)(2) (Supp. 1969), esped-
ally clauses (A) and (B), a court might hark back to the common law and require a
showing of causation.
36 C. McCoPMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 121 (1935).
367W. PROSSER, supra note 282, 750-53.
868 The extent of the loss must be ascertainable, not speculative or contingent, in
order to recover for deceit. Id. at 748.
369 Id. at 750-51.
370 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 366, at § 121.
871 15 U.S.C.A. § 1709(e) (Supp. 1969).
372 d. § 1709(c).
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profit exists, and the purchaser can speculate at the developer's
risk.373
6. Miscellaneous Provisions Affecting Remedies.- The fore-
going excursus on the remedy aspects of the Act does not augur well
for developers who are caught in its web. Still less encouraging to
the developer (and his agent) will be the knowledge that he can-
not "contract around" the potential nightmare.3 74  Moreover, all
remedies outside the Act, at law or equity, are preserved.375
A ray of hope, perhaps, is the peculiarly worded statute of limi-
tations which is divided into two categories. Actions based on false
or misleading statements of record or property reports must be
brought within one year after the untruth or omission was or should
have been discovered, but in no event later than three years after
sale or lease.Y Oddly enough, however, a two year period of limi-
tations runs from the date of violation with respect to actions based
on noneffectiveness of a statement of record at the time of sale or
lease, failure to use a property report before the purchaser or lessee
signs, and use of fraudulent selling literature and methods.Y Thus,
to take an extreme case, if a developer makes a false or misleading
offer (and completes an oral gentlemen's agreement) two years
before the buyer receives the property report and signs a contract,
the statute may have run on the fraudulent act before the purchaser
has a chance to read the property report and learn of the deception.
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps, as some practicing lawyers have said only half-jokingly,
the Land Sales Act has been the best kept secret of the century. The
absence of fanfare, however, should not be interpreted as an indica-
tion that this new law lacks scope or muscle. Even if exemptions
are freely allowed by HUD and the courts, the Act represents a fac-
tor to be reckoned with on a day-to-day basis by counsel for real
estate clients. It may be some time before HUD develops sufficient
internal procedures and know-how to become an active force in the
3 73 All of this results from an unfortunate garbling of the language of Securities Act
section 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964), which the drafters of the Land Sales Act were
apparently attempting to follow. Section 11(e) requires the use of price after com-
mencement of suit but before judgment if it reduces the amount of damages computed
using value or price of disposal before suit.
374 Section 1413, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1712 (Supp. 1969), voids all waivers of compliance
with the Act or Regulations.
a75 !d. § 1713.
37 Id. § 1711.
377 Id.
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administration of the Act, but the private civil remedies have, since
the Act became effective on April 28, 1969, posed a real threat to
the seller of lots.
There may be a tendency to dismiss the Act as a congressional
aberration which represents a significant problem only for those
developers who peddle wasteland in eastern Oregon to little old
ladies in Wayland, Massachusetts1 8  This is not the case. It may
also apply to the developer who creates a subdivision just outside
Los Angeles and then sells a substantial majority of the lots to resi-
dents of that city. The following words of Senators Tower, Ben-
nett, and Hickenlooper will no doubt haunt many a developer:
We want to point out our concern .. that the bill still deals with
promotional plans not for the purpose of selling land interstate.379
Is this the lull before the storm?
378 Certainly, it was this type of deal which originally stimulated congressional in-
terest in the land sales industry. This article would be incomplete without the follow-
ing bit of humor which came to light in the 1966 Hearings. A newspaper reporter told
the story of a New England lady who had written to a district attorney in Oregon to find
out about the land she had purchased sight-unseen. The district attorney replied, in
part:
"You asked me if I can dispose of your land. I cannot and do not think I
could give it away. I am not in the real estate business, but have practiced
law in Oregon for about 40 years and while lawyers are often accused of
crimes and misdemeanors and practices not consistent with good morals, justly
or otherwise, yet I have never known a lawyer who has been guilty of selling
such land as yours, even to an enemy; this, for two reasons, first the honor that
every lawyer possesses would deter him from an act of this kind, and, secondly,
he could not sell it.
If the gambling microbe has entered in your system and you must gamble,
hunt up a poker game at home and sit in but leave Western land games to the
people of the West * * * Your land has no present value * * * It is very hard,
rough, rocky and destitute of vegetation of any kind and the whole section
would not support more than a jackrabbit and his wife, and, if there were
any children, they would be compelled to go to Nevada to keep from starv-
ing to death. Your land is about 111 miles from a road and not more than
20 from Hades and owing to the roads and the nearness of the latter place, few
people go to the railroad." 1966 Hearings 20.
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